EU integration is the last thing we
need
No matter how crisis-ridden and corrupt the EU becomes, the elites’ solution is always: ‘More EU!’
by Jason Walsh
Announcing plans for greater
European political integration, German chancellor Angela Merkel and French
president Nicolas Sarkozy promised late last month that they would defend the
Euro. Their plans include appointing a Eurozone president to oversee financial
governance for the entire Eurozone group; all 17 member states writing guarantees
of ‘balanced budgets’ into their constitutions; and introducing a tax on
financial transactions.
The announcement came hot on the
heels of just another ordinary week in the Eurozone: markets in turmoil, bank
shares plummeting and demands for ever-greater austerity. In August, the share
price of French bank Société Générale, stuffed full of delicious Greek debt,
took a precipitous 15 per cent tumble, very nearly taking much of the rest of
France’s banking system down with it, while the EU was forced to gobble up €22
billion worth of Italian and Spanish government bonds – a bizarre spectacle
that saw Italy, the eighth-largest economy in the world, in danger of joining
the bailout club.
There’s no doubt about it: the EU is
in panic mode. While the urgency of the crisis is rather new, the fact remains
that the whole European project lost its sheen quite some time ago. This fact
is borne out by the message sent by voters to the EU on the few occasions they
have been allowed to express an opinion in a meaningful poll.
The past few years haven’t exactly
been kind to those who seek closer European integration. On top of the markets’
lack of faith in the EU, there have been clear signs that the various European
publics have had enough of the EU project. First there was the rejection of the
European constitution by the French and Dutch electorates. Then came the Irish
people’s rejection, followed by grudging acceptance, of the Lisbon Treaty. Vast
amounts of money were later sunk into propping up the Greek, Irish and
Portuguese economies (and, ultimately, French and German banks) and then there
have been a couple of years of on-and-off rioting in Greece.
And yet, every time the crisis
deepens, two things happen: the EU and its defenders tighten the austerity
screw into people’s heads and make blustering calls for ‘more Europe’.
A good example was a recent piece in
the Guardian by Nicholas Berggruen, the founder of a private investment
company, and Nouriel Roubini, an economist and member of the Council on the
Future of Europe think tank. They bluntly stated: ‘More European integration,
not less, is the only solution.’ According to this pair, nationalist demons
stalk the continent. In fairness, they also admit that there is a ‘democratic
deficit’ at the heart of the EU, but their idea that the European Parliament
needs to be ‘empowered’ is misguided. This may make the EU, as a bloc, more
democratic, but at the price of weakening national parliaments. The authors,
like many others, fall into the trap of seeing the EU’s problems as a mere
technical matter that can be magicked away by, you guessed it, more Europe.
In whose interests does the EU
actually work? One needn’t descend to the level of the fevered conspiratorial
fantasies or banal complaints about the EU being a ‘club for bosses’ to have
some doubts about its composition and mission.
Since its foundation, the EU has
been decried by Eurosceptics as a vehicle for the creation of a single European
superstate, but aside from a few kite-flyers no one has seriously suggested a
United States of Europe. Yes, the EU constantly pushes for greater integration,
but this is also coupled with denial that it is in fact doing so. Even the
father of the EU, Jean Monnet, eventually accepted that his dream of a united
Europe was an unlikely one. The powers that the EU has are, as often as not,
granted to it by national parliaments willingly ceding them in a desperate bid
to dodge political responsibility.
The EU has a remarkable propensity
for funding propaganda programmes and awarding study grants to those who seek
to write complimentary things about it. What it does not do is openly argue
that a single European political entity would be beneficial for the people of
Europe.
The EU’s subterranean drive for
integration has come to a head since the European Central Bank (ECB) decided to
engage in a series of bailouts to Greece (whose exit from the Euro now looks
inevitable), as well as to Ireland and Portugal. Ostensibly designed to stop
the ‘contagion’ spreading to larger countries, the bailouts are in fact fund
transfers to France and Germany. They take money out of the bruised economies
in the hope, ultimately, of propping-up the larger ones that lent to them.
Now, ECB president Jean-Claude
Trichet has called for the creation of a single Eurozone finance ministry. The
implications of any such move would be staggering: a vast chunk of national
sovereignty would be gone in one fell swoop, with countries’ forced to
implement EU diktat, not only in general terms as is the case now, but actually
in minute detail.
Bailout countries already have the
parameters of their budgets defined by the so-called troika of the EU, ECB and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Few have stopped to notice that the IMF,
long the bogeyman of transnational organisations, is asking for significantly
less in the way of pain than the supposedly cuddly, we’re-all-in-it-together
EU. It is also striking that there hasn’t been any serious attempt in any of
the bailout countries to implement policies that would lead to growth.
Investment is out; higher taxes and swingeing cuts are in. This inevitably
leads to further depression in consumer demand and, ultimately, deepening of
the recession.
Plans now being mooted would further
centralise economic and fiscal policy in the hands of the EU elite, away from
the national parliaments and, ultimately, electorates. It is hard to interpret
the Franco-German plans for a common corporate-taxation rate as anything other
than a precursor for full tax-harmonisation within the Eurozone. Such moves,
and the imposition of direct EU taxes, would diminish the right of national
governments to set fiscal policy and it would further strengthen the EU as a
political entity.
Other ideas rejected - so far - by
Merkel and Sarkozy are no less interfering. For example, the proposed
beefing-up of the bailout scheme, currently known as the European Financial
Stability Facility (EFSF), into a full-blown European Monetary Fund (EMF) is
contingent on handing Brussels direct oversight of national budgets. Even the
more popular idea of ECB-issued Eurobonds (proposed by Italy’s finance minister
Giulio Tremonti and supported by none other than billionaire financier George
Soros) to replace the current ad-hoc system is only workable if the EU’s
largest economy, Germany, is willing to swallow it. That will only be possible
if Germany gets to set fiscal policy in other countries via EU proxy.
When it comes to the Eurozone
crisis, the proposed cure is at least as bad as the disease. But in demanding
more power the EU is appealing to a trend for removing control of national
bodies from politicians and, ultimately, national electorates. Last month,
Ireland created the Fiscal Advisory Council, an EU-mandated ‘independent body’
that will oversee Ireland’s budget-making process. Soon after it came to power,
Britain’s Lib-Con coalition handed fiscal power over to the unelected Office
for Budget Responsibility without the need for diktat from the EU.
Of course, magical solutions to the
Eurozone crisis don’t exist. Living in Ireland, I don’t much relish the
collapse of, or an Irish exit from, the Euro. It’s one thing to argue we should
never have joined; it’s entirely another thing to say we should walk away now.
As the experience of Iceland shows, with the massive devaluation akin to that
of its currency after the banking crisis, the consequences would be to drive up
the cost of imports and drive down living standards.
A currency worth slightly more than
a handful of gravel may encourage tourism and, eventually, exports (bearing in
mind that manufacturing plants are not built overnight). But, rather more
immediately, it would also render purchasing anything other than life’s most
basic necessities – not to mention repaying Euro-denominated personal loans and
mortgages – a Sisyphean task.
Nevertheless, if we accept that it
was the basic divergence of Eurozone economies that laid the foundation for the
Euro crisis, why on Earth would we assume that the answer is to do anything and
everything we can to keep the Euro together? Tying together fiscal policy
across the Eurozone would come at a huge political cost and does not guarantee
an end to the slump.
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