It is culture that creates economics, and not
the other way around.
By ROGER SCRUTON
I first visited Greece 50 years ago,
hitchhiking with a school friend from England, in search of the glorious world
of Homer, Plato, and Thucydides. Of course, we didn't find that world. But we
found something almost as remarkable, which was a place where the church and
the priesthood dominated rural life, where villages were self-contained
communities, where local saints enjoyed their festivals and where the old
dances were still danced in the village squares, men in groups, and women in
groups, dressed in the costumes that survived from Ottoman days, and rehearsing
the old drama of the sexes with marriage as its eternal dénouement. It was a
country that had yet to enter the modern world. Its rhythms were those of the
village, where debts and duties were local, and where sun, sleep, and surrender
managed the day. It was inconceivable to a young Anglo-Saxon visitor that such
a country could be judged in the same terms as Germany or France, or that it
could play a comparable role in an economy that included all three countries as
equal partners.
At one point, running out of money, I joined
the queue at a hospital in Athens, where you could give blood and be paid in
drachmas. The presiding doctor leaped up to welcome the tall red-haired youth,
and turned away the two small men who preceded me, judging their blood to be
useless. The names of my unsuccessful rivals were Heracles and Dionysus. It was
the only sign offered to me during that first visit that these people were
descended from the Greeks to whom our civilization is owed.
I have no desire to return to Greece, dreading
what the tourists and the property speculators have done to it. But I know
that, whatever the changes, it is inconceivable that Greece should have
developed in the same way and with the same rhythm as France or Germany. Of
course the country has been modernized. Roads have been built and towns
expanded. The tourist trade has wiped out the gentle manners of the villagers.
Sexual intercourse has begun -- somewhat later than 1963, which is when Philip Larkin famously dated
it, but nevertheless with the same devastating effect on marriage and the
family. No doubt the old modes of the folk songs have been forgotten, and no
doubt the multinational brands have slapped their logos on shop fronts across
the land. But for sure the culture of local obligation has remained. For sure
people still regard leisure as more important than work, and debts as less
important, the further away the creditor lies in the network of human
relations. If you don't know this from visiting Greece, you could learn it
easily enough from reading Kazantzakis, Ritzos, Seferis, or any other of the
writers in that great moment of literary flourishing which succeeded the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire. You could even get it from Louis de Bernières
and Captain Corelli's Mandolin. Anybody with his eyes open and his heart in
place would know that Greece is the product of a distinctive culture, and that
this culture, however it develops, will always take the country in a direction
and at a speed of its own.
YET THE ARCHITECTS of the euro did not know
this. If they had known it, they would have known also that the effect of
imposing a single currency on Greece and Germany would be to encourage Greece
to transfer its debts to Germany, on the understanding that the further away
the creditor the less the obligation to repay. They would have known that if
the Greek political class can use sovereign debt to pay family, friends, and
dependents, and to buy the votes needed to stay in office, that that is what
the political class will do. They would have recognized that laws, obligations,
and sovereignty don't have quite the same meaning in the Mediterranean as they
do on the Baltic, and that in a society used to kleptocratic government the
fairest way out of an economic crisis is by devaluation--in other words, by
stealing equally from everybody.
Why didn't the architects of the euro know
those things? The answer is to be found deep within the European project. For
it was a project with a secret agenda, and that agenda was to destroy, and
meanwhile to deny, the reality of nationhood. And since nations are the
carriers of culture, this meant denying that culture matters. Cultural facts
were simply imperceivable to the Eurocrats. Allowing themselves to perceive
culture would be tantamount to recognizing that their project was an impossible
one. This would have mattered less if they had another project with which to
replace it. But--like all radical projects--that of the European Union was
conceived without a Plan B. Hence it is destined to collapse and, in the course
of its collapse, to drag our continent down. An enormous pool of pretense has
accumulated at the center of the project, while the political class skirmishes
at the edges, in an attempt to fend off the constant assaults of reality. But
this pool of pretense is a festering wound at the heart of things, and one day
it will burst and swamp us all with poison.
Thus we have to pretend that the long-observed
distinctions between the Protestant north of our continent and the Catholic and
Orthodox south is of no economic significance. Being a cultural fact it is
imperceivable, notwithstanding Weber's attempt to make it central to economic
history. The difference between the culture of common law and that of the Code
Napoléon, between the Roman and the Ottoman legal legacies, between countries
where law is certain and judges incorruptible and places where law is only the
last resort in a system of bribes--all these differences have to be put out of
mind. Times and speeds of work, and the balance between work and leisure, which
go to the heart of every community since they define its relation to time, are
to be ignored, or else regimented by a futile edict from the center. And
everything is to be brought into line by those frightening courts--the European
Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights--whose unelected judges
never pay the cost of their decisions, and whose agenda of
"non-discrimination" and "ever-closer union" is designed to
wipe away the traces of local loyalties, family-based morality, and rooted ways
of life. Not surprisingly, when you build an empire on such massive pretenses,
it very soon becomes unstable.
IT WAS MARX WHO ARGUED that the foundation of
social order and the motor of social change resides in economic structures, and
that culture is merely the by-product--the assemblage of institutions and
ideologies--that rises from the economic foundations and keeps them in place.
Hence it was to Marx that we owed that first and disastrous attempt to organize
society on economic principles alone, and to assume that culture will look
after itself. In fact it is culture that creates economics, and not the other
way round, and if any proof of this is needed we need only look at the result
of the Marxist experiment. Better still, we might look at the successful
economies in the modern world--the American for instance--and note the extent
to which they have depended on a respect for law, on honest accounting, and on
individual responsibility, the ethic of family life, and the forms of social
interaction. To analyze all the strands that have been woven together to form
the American capacity for long-term economic probity you would have to trace
the culture of this country back to the founding and beyond. You would have to
take account of Protestantism, the common law, the tradition of private
colleges, and the little platoons of a society of volunteers. You would have to
understand the frontier spirit, the deep local loyalties, and the cultural
miscegenation that gave rise to jazz, Hollywood, and the Broadway musical.
Of course, I share the belief of many American
conservatives that this culture is being lost, and indeed that America has
taken fatal steps in the European direction. But this change has itself been
initiated at the cultural level. Left to itself the American economy would not
have incurred the truly fantastic debts that have been heaped on it by the
maladministration of Bush and Obama. In each case cultural factors have driven
the leadership to hold the country hostage to ideological goals. And the same
is true of Europe. It was not economics but culture that engendered the euro--a
culture of a ruling class at war with the people of Europe, wishing to
establish trans-national government at all costs, and hoping to wipe away yet
another trace of nationhood. By destroying those ancient currencies through
which the people of Europe had expressed and managed their apartness, the
European elite hoped to make a decisive move toward the goal of Union. Instead
they have burdened the continent with new debts, new resentments, and a looming
disaster that was not foreseen only because it had been ruled out as
impossible.
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