Dithering at the Top Turned EU Crisis to Global Disaster
By CHARLES FORELLE and MARCUS WALKER
At a closed-door meeting in Washington on April 14,
Europe's effort to contain its debt crisis began to unravel.
Inside the French ambassador's 19-bedroom mansion,
finance ministers and central bankers from the world's largest economies heard
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, then-head of the International Monetary Fund, deliver
an ultimatum.
Greece, the country that triggered the euro-zone debt
crisis, would need a much bigger bailout than planned, Mr. Strauss-Kahn said.
Unless Europe coughed up extra cash, the IMF, which a year earlier had agreed
to share the burden with European countries, wouldn't release any more aid for
Athens.
The warning prompted a split among the euro zone's
representatives over who should pay to save Greece from the biggest sovereign
bankruptcy in history. European taxpayers alone? Or should the banks that had
lent Greece too much during the global credit bubble also suffer?
The IMF didn't mind how Europe proceeded, as long as
there was clarity by summer. "We need a decision," said Mr.
Strauss-Kahn.
It was to be Europe's fateful spring. A Wall Street
Journal investigation, based on more than two dozen interviews with euro-zone
policy makers, revealed how the currency union floundered in indecision—failing
to address either the immediate concerns of investors or the fundamental
weaknesses undermining the euro. The consequence was that a crisis in a few
small economies turned into a threat to the survival of Europe's common
currency and a menace to the global economy.
In April, after a year of drama and bailouts, the euro
zone seemed to have contained the immediate crisis to Greece and other small
countries. Crucially, euro-zone economies such as Spain and Italy had avoided
the panicked flight of capital. They were still able to borrow money at
affordable rates in the bond market.
Now, as the bloc's leaders rush to forge a closer
political union, the lesson of that period looms large. Investor trust in
public debt is part of the foundation on which all nation-states depend. And in
Europe's common currency—a unique experiment with the livelihoods of 330
million people—nations will win or lose that trust together.
The dispute at the Washington meeting divided two of
the Continent's grand old men, both of them born in 1942 and both among the
fathers of the euro.
Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany's ascetic and irascible
finance minister, understood the IMF's ultimatum. The euro zone would have to
draw up a second bailout package for Greece by summer, just a year after a loan
deal for €110 billion, or $140 billion.
But this time, Mr. Schäuble said, "We cannot just
buy out the private investors" with taxpayer money. That would reward
reckless lending, he said, and it would never get through an increasingly
impatient German parliament. Greece's bondholders would be required to lend
more money, Mr. Schäuble proposed, rather than take payment for their bonds at
maturity.
Jean-Claude Trichet, the urbane French head of the
European Central Bank, warned against forcing bondholders to put in more money,
which would effectively delay repayment. "This is not a good way to go in
a monetary union," Mr. Trichet said. "Investors would avoid all
euro-area bonds."
Mr. Trichet, in the twilight of a 36-year career as a
finance official, feared that if Greece didn't honor its bond debts on time,
the implicit trust that kept credit flowing to many weak euro-zone governments
would shatter. More countries and their banks would lose access to capital
markets, in a chain reaction with incalculable consequences.
Meanwhile, the cost for fixing Greece was rising. The
Athens government's budget deficit was stuck at a stubbornly high level.
Italian and Spanish borrowing costs were still
affordable and stable. The yield on Spain's 10-year bonds hovered around 5.3%;
on Italy's, around 4.6%.
The debate over making bondholders contribute to the
new funding package for Greece—known as private-sector involvement, or
PSI—divided euro-zone countries.
Germany had allies. In the Netherlands and Finland,
new governments had promised voters they wouldn't pay for problems in
less-frugal Mediterranean countries. Breaking those promises would risk
rebellions in parliament.
But France joined the ECB in resisting burden-sharing
by bondholders. France's banks had lent more heavily than Germany's to Greece
and other indebted euro nations, and France fretted about a Lehman Brothers-style
banking-system meltdown. Italian officials also feared that a precedent for
losses in Greece would scare investors away from Italy's bonds.
Three weeks after the Washington gathering, on Friday,
May 6, panic erupted. German news weekly Der Spiegel reported that Greece was
thinking of leaving the euro zone, with policy makers heading to a secret
meeting that night in Luxembourg.
Inside a country chateau, top euro-zone officials told
Greece's finance minister they expected deeper austerity and faster reforms in
return for a new aid package.
Then Mr. Schäuble said he wanted to discuss how
bondholder burden-sharing would work. The usually smooth-mannered Mr. Trichet
lost his patience. "I want to put my position on the record," he
said: "I don't agree with private-sector involvement, so I won't take part
in a discussion about the practicalities." He stormed out.
Mr. Trichet's assent was vital. If the ECB were to
stop accepting Greek bonds as collateral for its lending to banks on the
grounds that the bonds were in default, then Greece's banks, which were stuffed
full of their government's bonds, would quickly run out of cash and collapse.
That would radically drive up the cost of a rescue.
In Greece, a new wave of mass strikes and
demonstrations was starting. Protesters, angry about Europe's imposition of
extra spending cuts and tax hikes, clashed with police in front of the Athens
parliament in the biggest and most violent protests in a year.
Many euro-zone governments hoped Mr. Strauss-Kahn
could find a way to relax the IMF's summer deadline. The IMF chief was due to
discuss the matter with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin on May 15,
and with euro-zone finance ministers in Brussels the next day.
Mr. Strauss-Kahn couldn't attend. Police in New York
pulled him off his Paris-bound flight and charged him with sexually assaulting
a hotel chambermaid. (The charges were later dropped, and prosecutors said they
doubted the maid's reliability.) An aide phoned Ms. Merkel at her
central-Berlin home that Saturday and told her the news. The astonished
chancellor responded with a German idiom that translates roughly as: "You
couldn't make this up."
The IMF sent a lower-ranking official to Brussels in
his place who had no latitude to deviate from the IMF's deadline.
In Athens, meanwhile, a tent city of the
"Indignant" protest movement—a groundswell of anger at the country's
impoverishment—sprang up outside parliament. Spain's bond prices began to
wobble as investors worried that other countries might also face debt
restructuring.
On June 1, Mr. Schäuble's deputy, Jörg Asmussen,
presented a German plan at a meeting of finance officials in Vienna, at the
Hofburg palace of the former Habsburg emperors. It involved pressuring Greece's
bondholders to swap their Greek debt for new IOUs that would come due far in
the future. That would cut the amount of European taxpayer funding Greece would
need.
For the ECB, Mr. Trichet's deputy Vitor Constâncio, of
Portugal, denounced the German plan as "dangerous." Credit-rating
agencies would declare Greece to be in default on some of its debts—a so-called
selective default. In that case, Mr. Constâncio warned, the ECB would refuse to
accept Greek government bonds as collateral, dealing a death blow to Greek
banks. France, Italy and Spain all supported Mr. Constâncio.
Germany's Mr. Asmussen shot back with a threat of his
own. Europe needed Germany's money to fund a new program of Greek loans.
"Without private-sector involvement," he said, "there will be no
program."
Greece was descending into chaos. Embattled premier
George Papandreou's slender majority in parliament was fraying. On June 15, a
swelling demonstration in Athens's central square veered out of control.
Alone in his office, Mr. Papandreou phoned the
parliamentary opposition leader and offered to make way for a national-unity
government. Talks broke down, and the Greek government limped on badly wounded.
Even Ms. Merkel had some doubts about her finance ministry's
hard-line insistence that Greece's bondholders take a loss. On June 17, she
discussed a softer plan with French President Nicolas Sarkozy: a gentleman's
agreement under which Greek bonds would be honored but the bondholders would
volunteer to buy new ones.
Mr. Schäuble pushed back. The veteran conservative
politician was Berlin's biggest supporter of the European dream, but he was
also the keeper of Germany's purse. He was determined to make banks share the
burden with German taxpayers, and he didn't trust them to keep a gentleman's
agreement.
When finance ministers met again on June 20, Mr.
Schäuble pushed harder. Greece's bondholders should be told not merely to
accept a delay in repayment, he said, but also to forgive some Greek debt—a
so-called haircut.
As Greece's economy moved toward free fall, its debts
were soaring beyond the country's ability to pay, the Germans and their
northern allies argued. Mr. Trichet and the southern countries resisted. Talks
dragged on for hours. The ministers knew they couldn't leave without some
agreement.
They tried to please everyone: Greece would get more
aid. Bondholder losses would be substantial, to placate the Germans, Dutch and
Finns. But as the ECB insisted, they would avoid pushing Greece into selective
default.
Investors knew you couldn't have it both ways. As the
threat of a Greek debt restructuring sank in, Southern Europe's bond markets
grew volatile. Spain's 10-year bond yield rose above 5.6%. Italy's reached
4.9%.
Greece's parliament debated the extra austerity
measures that Europe demanded. Central Athens erupted in violent protests.
Anarchist youths tore up chunks of paving stone and threw them at riot police,
who fired back with tear gas and stun grenades. Café parasols burned.
Europe hadn't resolved how to keep Greece afloat. The
IMF—whose demand for a decision had set off the whole argument—softened its
ultimatum. IMF officials said they were satisfied that Europe would sort out
some kind of new bailout, and wired Greece its summer aid payment on July 8.
It wasn't enough to calm markets. Spain's bond yield
hit 6.3%. Italy's rose to over 5.8%. Such borrowing costs, if sustained, would
make it hard for both countries to rein in their debts.
Determined not to let the summit pass without an
agreement, Ms. Merkel invited the French president, who objected to the German
push for bondholder losses, to Berlin. The pair and their advisers met for
dinner in the German chancellery the night before the meeting.
Few of them had time to touch the duck breast and
vegetables on their plates as they searched for a compromise. Finally, Mr.
Sarkozy said he would accept the private-sector involvement—if Ms. Merkel
dropped her resistance to giving the euro-zone bailout fund broad new powers to
buy debt of weak countries directly and move to protect such countries as Spain
and Italy from bond-market contagion. Ms. Merkel agreed.
One more person needed to sign off. Ms. Merkel phoned
Mr. Trichet at his Frankfurt office. He took the last Lufthansa flight to
Berlin and arrived at the chancellery around 10 p.m.
Reluctantly, Mr. Trichet gave his OK. But he set
conditions. Governments would have to insure Greek bonds against default so
that the ECB could continue to accept them as collateral. And they would have
to make plain that no other euro country but Greece would have its debts
restructured.
The trio's deal was both complicated and vague. Their
staffs had little time to flesh out details before the next day's summit in
Brussels. As leaders trickled into the European Union's boxy headquarters, Ms.
Merkel faced a challenge to placate the euro zone's south, which thought
private-sector involvement was dangerous, and its north, which thought it didn't
go far enough.
When the leaders assembled at the sprawling summit
table, Ms. Merkel admitted that the specter of bondholder losses was causing
market unrest. But, she said, some Greek debt relief was essential. Without it,
the bailout's tough austerity conditions—made tougher by Greece's missing its
budget goals—would be seen as unbearable.
All 17 euro nations had to agree to private-sector
involvement. But presented with a calculation that the plan would reduce
Greece's debt by only about €19 billion out of more than €350 billion total,
Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte balked. If it's only €19 billion, he said,
"I'm out. I need more."
Finnish premier Jyrki Katainen also complained. His
parliament wanted collateral in exchange for more Finnish lending to Greece.
"No collateral, no agreement from me," he said.
Then it was Slovakia's turn. Prime Minister Iveta
Radičová was fighting to keep her coalition together over aid for Greece—a
richer country than her own. Adding more powers to the bailout fund "would
be suicide," she said.
Greece's Mr. Papandreou pleaded for help. "If we
can't solve even Greece, we won't be seen as being able to solve anything
else," he said.
Hours later, the leaders had a communiqué. To appease
the holdouts, it left key points broad and noncommittal, offering the
possibility of collateral to Finland and describing the complex bondholder deal
in a few strokes, vague language that would return to haunt the bloc.
Officials struggled to explain the new Greek bailout
and the bondholder losses. Amid the confusion, Mr. Rutte dispensed muddled
numbers. Bank analysts put out flawed reports.
Investor confidence faltered as it became clear that
Europe's compromise achieved the worst of all worlds. Greece would be pushed
into a historic default—the first time in nearly 60 years that a developed,
Western country wouldn't honor its debts. But the default was so small that
Greece was still left with a crushing debt burden.
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