By George Friedman
The idea of Germany having an independent national
strategy runs counter to everything that Germany has wanted to be since World
War II and everything the world has wanted from Germany. In a way, the entire
structure of modern Europe was created to take advantage of Germany's economic
dynamism while avoiding the threat of German domination. In writing about
German strategy, I am raising the possibility that the basic structure of
Western Europe since World War II and of Europe as a whole since 1991 is coming
to a close.
If so, then the question is whether historical patterns of German strategy will emerge or something new is coming. It is, of course, always possible that the old post-war model can be preserved. Whichever it is, the future of German strategy is certainly the most important question in Europe and quite possibly in the world.
Before 1871, when Germany was fragmented into a large
number of small states, it did not pose a challenge to Europe. Rather, it
served as a buffer between France on one side and Russia and Austria on the other.
Napoleon and his campaign to dominate Europe first changed the status of
Germany, both overcoming the barrier and provoking the rise of Prussia, a
powerful German entity. Prussia became instrumental in creating a united
Germany in 1871, and with that, the geopolitics of Europe changed.
What had been a morass of states became not only a
unified country but also the most economically dynamic country in Europe -- and
the one with the most substantial ground forces. Germany was also inherently insecure. Lacking any real
strategic depth, Germany could not survive a simultaneous attack by France and
Russia. Therefore, Germany's core strategy was to prevent the emergence of an
alliance between France and Russia. However, in the event that there was no
alliance between France and Russia, Germany was always tempted to solve the
problem in a more controlled and secure way, by defeating France and ending the
threat of an alliance. This is the strategy Germany has chosen for most of its
existence.
The dynamism of Germany did not create the effect that Germany wanted. Rather than split France and Russia, the threat of a united Germany drew them together. It was clear to France and Russia that without an alliance, Germany would pick them off individually. In many ways, France and Russia benefited from an economically dynamic Germany. It not only stimulated their own economies but also provided an alternative to British goods and capital. Nevertheless, the economic benefits of relations with Germany did not eliminate the fear of Germany. The idea that economics rule the decisions of nations is insufficient for explaining their behavior.
Germany was confronted with a strategic problem. By
the early 20th century the Triple Entente, signed in 1907, had allied Russia,
France and the United Kingdom. If they attacked simultaneously at a time of
their choosing, these countries could destroy Germany. Therefore, Germany's
only defense was to launch a war at a time of its choosing, defeat one of these
countries and deal with the others at its leisure. During both World War I and
World War II, Germany first struck at France and then turned to deal with
Russia while keeping the United Kingdom at bay. In both wars, the strategy
failed. In World War I, Germany failed to defeat France and found itself in an
extended war on two fronts. In World War II, it defeated France but failed to
defeat Russia, allowing time for an Anglo-American counterattack in the west.
Binding Germany to Europe
Germany was divided after World War II. Whatever the
first inclinations of the victors, it became clear that a rearmed West Germany
was essential if the Soviet Union was going to be contained. If Germany was to
be rearmed, its economy had to be encouraged to grow, and what followed was the
German economic miracle. Germany again became the most dynamic part of Europe.
The issue was to prevent Germany from returning to the
pursuit of an autonomous national strategy, both because it could not resist
the Soviet forces to the east by itself and, more important, because the West
could not tolerate the re-emergence of divisive and dangerous power politics in
Europe. The key was binding Germany to the rest of Europe militarily and
economically. Put another way, the key was to make certain that German and
French interests coincided, since tension between France and Germany had been
one of the triggers of prior wars since 1871. Obviously, this also included
other Western European countries, but it was Germany's relationship with France
that was most important.
Militarily, German and French interests were tied
together under the NATO alliance even after France withdrew from the NATO
Military Committee under Charles de Gaulle. Economically, Germany was bound
with Europe through the emergence of more sophisticated multilateral economic
organizations that ultimately evolved into the European Union.
After World War II, West Germany's strategy was
threefold. First, it had to defend itself against the Soviet Union in concert
with an alliance that would effectively command its military through NATO. This
would limit German sovereignty but eliminate the perception of Germany as a
threat. Second, it would align its economy with that of the rest of Europe,
pursuing prosperity without undermining the prosperity of other countries.
Third, it would exercise internal political sovereignty, reclaiming its rights
as a nation without posing a geopolitical threat to Western Europe. After the
fall of the Soviet Union, this was extended to include Eastern European states.
The strategy worked well. There was no war with the
Soviets. There was no fundamental conflict in Western Europe and certainly none
that was military in nature. The European economy in general, and the German
economy in particular, surged once East Germany had been reintegrated with West
Germany. With reintegration, German internal sovereignty was insured. Most
important, France remained linked to Germany via the European Union and NATO.
Russia, or what was left after the collapse of the Soviet Union, was relatively
secure so long as Germany remained part of European structures. The historical
strategic problem Germany had faced appeared solved.
Europe's Economic Crisis
The situation became more complex after 2008.
Germany's formal relationship with NATO remained intact, but without the common
threat of the Soviet Union, the alliance was fracturing over the divergent
national interests of its members. The European Union had become Germany's
focus, and the bloc had come under intense pressure that made the prior
alignment of all European countries more dubious. Germany needed the European
Union. It needed it for the reasons that have existed since World War II: as a
foundation of its relationship with France and as a means to ensure that
national interest would not generate the kinds of conflicts that had existed in
the past.
It needed the European Union for another reason as well. Germany is the second-largest exporter in the world. It exports to many countries, but Europe is a critical customer. The free-trade zone that was the foundation of the European Union was also one of the foundations of the German economy. Protectionism in general, but certainly protectionism in Europe, threatened Germany, whose industrial plant substantially outstripped its domestic consumption. The pricing of the euro aided German exports, and regulations in Brussels gave Germany other advantages. The European Union, as it existed between 1991 and 2008, was critical to Germany.
However, the European Union no longer functions as it
once did. The economic dynamics of Europe have placed many countries at a
substantial disadvantage, and the economic crisis of 2008 triggered a sovereign
debt crisis and banking crisis in Europe.
There were two possible solutions in the broadest
sense. One was that the countries in crisis impose austerity in order to find
the resources to solve their problem. The other was that the prosperous part of
Europe underwrites the debts, sparing these countries the burden of austerity.
The solution that has been chosen is obviously a combination of the two, but the
precise makeup of that combination was and remains a complex matter for
negotiation.
Germany needs the European Union to survive for both
political and economic reasons. The problem is that it is not clear that a
stable economic solution can emerge that will be supported by the political
systems in Europe.
Germany is prepared to bail out other European
countries if they impose austerity and then take steps to make sure that the
austerity is actually implemented to the degree necessary and that the crisis
is not repeated. From Germany's point of view, the roots of the crisis lie in
the fiscal policies of the troubled countries. Therefore, the German price for
underwriting part of the debt is that European bureaucrats, heavily oriented
toward German policies, be effectively put in charge of the finances of countries
receiving aid against default.
This would mean that these countries would not control
either taxes or budgets through their political system. It would be an assault
on democracy and national sovereignty. Obviously, there has been a great deal
of opposition from potential recipients of aid, but it is also opposed by some
countries that see it as something that would vastly increase the power of
Germany. If you accept the German view, which is that the debt crisis was the
result of reckless spending, then Germany's proposal is reasonable. If you
accept the view of southern Europe, which is that the crisis was the result of
the European Union's design, then what Germany is proposing is the imposition
of German power via economics.
It is difficult to imagine a vast surrender of
sovereignty to a German-dominated EU bureaucracy, whatever the economic cost.
It is also difficult to imagine Germany underwriting the debt without some
controls beyond promises; even if the European Union is vitally important to the
Germans, German public opinion will not permit it. Finally, it is difficult to
see how, in the long term, the Europeans can reconcile their differences on
this issue. The issue must come to a head, if not in this financial crisis then
in the next -- and there is always a next crisis.
An Alternative Strategy
In the meantime, the basic framework of Europe has
changed since 1991. Russia remains a shadow of the Soviet Union, but it has
become a major exporter of natural gas. Germany depends on that natural gas
even as it searches for alternatives. Russia is badly in need of technology,
which Germany has in abundance. Germany does not want to invite in any more
immigrants out of fear of instability. However, with a declining population,
Germany must do something.
Russia also has a declining population, but even so,
it has a surplus of workers, both unemployed and underemployed. If the workers
cannot be brought to the factories, the factories can be brought to the
workers. In short, there is substantial synergy between the Russian and German
economies. Add to this that the Germans feel under heavy pressure from the
United States to engage in actions the Germans want to be left out of, while
the Russians see the Americans as a threat to their interests, and there are
politico-military interests that Germany and Russia have in common.
NATO is badly frayed. The European Union is under
tremendous pressure and national interests are now dominating European
interests. Germany's ability to use the European Union for economic ends has
not dissipated but can no longer be relied on over the long term. Therefore, it
follows that Germany must be considering an alternative strategy. Its
relationship with Russia is such a strategy.
Germany is not an aggressive power. The foundation of
its current strategy is its relationship with France in the context of the
European Union. The current French government under President Nicolas Sarkozy
is certainly committed to this relationship, but the French political system,
like those of other European countries, is under intense pressure. The coming
elections in France are uncertain, and the ones after that are even less
predictable. The willingness of France to engage with Germany, which has a
massive trade imbalance with France, is an unknown.
However, Germany's strategic interest is not
necessarily a relationship with France but a relationship with either France or
Russia to avoid being surrounded by hostile powers. For Germany, a relationship
with Russia does as well as one with France. An ideal situation for Germany
would be a Franco-German-Russian entente. Such an alliance has been tried in
the past, but its weakness is that it would provide too much security to
Germany, allowing it to be more assertive. Normally, France and Russia have
opposed Germany, but in this case, it is certainly possible to have a
continuation of the Franco-German alliance or a Russo-French alliance. Indeed,
a three-way alliance might be possible as well.
Germany's current strategy is to preserve the European
Union and its relationship with France while drawing Russia closer into Europe.
The difficulty of this strategy is that Germany's trade policies are difficult
for other European countries to manage, including France. If Germany faces an
impossible situation with the European Union, the second strategic option would
be a three-way alliance, with a modified European Union or perhaps outside of
the EU structure. If France decides it has other interests, such as its idea of
a Mediterranean Union, then a German-Russian relationship becomes a real
possibility.
A German-Russian relationship would have the potential
to tilt the balance of power in the world. The United States is currently the
dominant power, but the combination of German technology and Russian resources
-- an idea dreamt of by many in the past -- would become a challenge on a
global basis. Of course, there are bad memories on both sides, and trust in the
deepest sense would be hard to come by. But although alliances rely on trust,
it does not necessarily have to be deep-seated trust.
Germany's strategy, therefore, is still locked in the
EU paradigm. However, if the EU paradigm becomes unsupportable, then other
strategies will have to be found. The Russo-German relationship already exists
and is deepening. Germany thinks of it in the context of the European Union,
but if the European Union weakens, Russia becomes Germany's natural alternative
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