By John Mauldin
When the
Eurozone was created it was the triumph of hope over the reality of political
and economic discord. Somehow, countries that had different languages, customs
and national characteristics; that had fought each other for centuries; and
that all had different views of themselves in relation to the rest of their
fellow Europeans, were supposed to come together into a fiscal union, because
they now shopped with the same money.
Rather than
simply creating a free-trade zone and allowing for a common understanding and
economic integration to develop over time, the European leaders wanted to
jump-start the process. And they had numerous critics. Many of the best and
brightest in the economics world pointed out the problems.
The reality is that the euro has never been a real currency. It is still an experiment. If it is even around in five years, it will be a true currency, as it will have endured its first real crisis. The peripheral countries used the low interest rates of the euro to borrow heavily (both privately and publicly) and got in trouble, and now the true costs of the euro project are being revealed.
A break-up will cost multiple trillions of euros. Keeping the eurozone together will cost multiple trillions of euros. But keeping the eurozone together will also cost countries a substantial loss of sovereign independence. When voters all over Europe signed on for the euro project, they did not think they were giving up their national independence and the right to control their own budgets.
Will Spain
or Italy or Germany be willing to allow a European institution to set their
budget priorities and limits? To set their retirement policies and health care?
To tax them independently? That is what is meant when one talks fiscal
integration. Germany is now a minority on the ECB and is beginning to realize
it has lost control. Will its voters want to give up political control and
become a minority in a "United States of Europe"?
That is the
true problem. When real economic difficulties arise, as in Greece or Spain,
voters tend to get rather touchy. Tensions rise. And the center does not hold.
George Soros
said this week that Europe has three months to resolve its problems. Nobel
Laureate Joseph Stiglitz said Soros was being optimistic. A decision is going
to have to be made quite soon about Spain, and likely before it becomes clear
whether Greece will stay in or leave the euro. And that makes it difficult to
give Spain aid that is not offered on equal terms to those Greece got.
Monetizing Spanish debt (however you want to do it or whatever you want to call
it) when Spain is running an almost 10% deficit, when it had agreed to a little
over 5% only a few months ago, will not sit well with Greece.
But it now
seems that Europe is unlikely to get the time it needs, absent some rabbit
pulled out of its monetary hat to allow Spain to borrow money at rates that it
can afford. The Endgame approaches. It will be a long summer.
I get asked
all the time if the euro will break up. The honest answer is, we really don't
know. I think the economically rational thing to do in the very long term is
for some countries to figure out how to leave the euro, but that is more a
political question than an economic one. And if you can tell me what
politicians and voters will do in a political crisis and deepening recession,
then your crystal ball is less foggy than mine.
I think it
is 50-50. The drive to hold the euro together will go head to head with
national self-interest. Right now, it depends on whom you ask as to what answer
you get. But I do not think we will be asking the question much longer. Soon
enough, we will know.
To be clear,
Europe has no good choices, only a choice among very distressing and expensive
options. This will not be good for them or for the world. I think we are
already seeing a global slowdown, in great part due to Europe. Let us hope they
get the answer right, whatever it is.
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