By Jan Crawford
(CBS News) Chief Justice John
Roberts initially sided with the Supreme Court's four conservative justices to
strike down the heart of President Obama's health care reform law, the
Affordable Care Act, but later changed his position and formed an alliance with
liberals to uphold the bulk of the law, according to two sources with specific
knowledge of the deliberations.
Roberts then withstood a
month-long, desperate campaign to bring him back to his original position, the
sources said. Ironically, Justice Anthony Kennedy - believed by many
conservatives to be the justice most likely to defect and vote for the law -
led the effort to try to bring Roberts back to the fold.
"He was relentless,"
one source said of Kennedy's efforts. "He was very engaged in this."
But this time, Roberts held
firm. And so the conservatives handed him their own message which, as one
justice put it, essentially translated into, "You're on your own."
The conservatives refused to join any aspect of his opinion, including sections with which they agreed, such as his analysis imposing limits on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause, the sources said.
Instead, the four joined
forces and crafted a highly unusual, unsigned joint dissent.
They deliberately ignored Roberts' decision, the sources said, as if they were
no longer even willing to engage with him in debate.
The inner-workings of the
Supreme Court are almost impossible to penetrate. The court's private
conferences, when the justices discuss cases and cast their initial votes,
include only the nine members - no law clerks or secretaries are permitted. The
justices are notoriously close-lipped, and their law clerks must agree to keep
matters completely confidential.
But in this closely-watched
case, word of Roberts' unusual shift has spread widely within the court, and is
known among law clerks, chambers' aides and secretaries. It also has stirred
the ire of the conservative justices, who believed Roberts was standing with
them.
After the historic oral
arguments in March, the two knowledgeable sources said, Roberts and the four
conservatives were poised to strike down at least the individual mandate. There
were other issues being argued - severability and the Medicaid extension - but
the mandate was the ballgame.
It required individuals to buy
insurance or pay a penalty. Congress had never before in the history of the
nation ordered Americans to buy a product from a private company as part of its
broad powers to regulate commerce. Opponents argued that the law exceeded
Congress' power under the Constitution, and an Atlanta-based federal appeals
court agreed.
The Atlanta-based federal
appeals court said Congress didn't have that kind of expansive power, and it
struck down the mandate as unconstitutional.
On this point - Congress'
commerce power - Roberts agreed. In the court's private conference immediately
after the arguments, he was aligned with the four conservatives to strike down
the mandate.
Roberts was less clear on
whether that also meant the rest of the law must fall, the source said. The
other four conservatives believed that the mandate could not be lopped off from
the rest of the law and that, since one key part was unconstitutional, the
entire law must be struck down.
Because Roberts was the most
senior justice in the majority to strike down the mandate, he got to choose
which justice would write the court's historic decision. He kept it for
himself.
Over the next six weeks, as
Roberts began to craft the decision striking down the mandate, the external
pressure began to grow. Roberts almost certainly was aware of it.
Some of the conservatives,
such as Justice Clarence Thomas, deliberately avoid news articles on the court
when issues are pending (and avoid some publications altogether, such as The
New York Times). They've explained that they don't want to be influenced by
outside opinion or feel pressure from outlets that are perceived as liberal.
But Roberts pays attention to
media coverage. As chief justice, he is keenly aware of his leadership role on
the court, and he also is sensitive to how the court is perceived by the
public.
There were countless news
articles in May warning of damage to the court - and to Roberts' reputation -
if the court were to strike down the mandate. Leading politicians, including
the president himself, had expressed confidence the mandate would be upheld.
Some even suggested that if
Roberts struck down the mandate, it would prove he had been deceitful during
his confirmation hearings, when he explained a philosophy of judicial
restraint.
It was around this time that
it also became clear to the conservative justices that Roberts was, as one put
it, "wobbly," the sources said.
It is not known why Roberts
changed his view on the mandate and decided to uphold the law. At least one
conservative justice tried to get him to explain it, but was unsatisfied with
the response, according to a source with knowledge of the conversation.
Some informed observers
outside the court flatly reject the idea that Roberts buckled to liberal
pressure, or was stared down by the president. They instead believe that
Roberts realized the historical consequences of a ruling striking down the
landmark health care law. There was no doctrinal background for the Court to
fall back on - nothing in prior Supreme Court cases - to say the individual
mandate crossed a constitutional line.
The case raised entirely new
issues of power. Never before had Congress tried to force Americans to buy a
private product; as a result, never before had the court ruled Congress lacked
that power. It was completely uncharted waters.
To strike down the mandate as
exceeding the Commerce Clause, the court would have to craft a new theory,
which could have opened it up to criticism that it reached out to declare the
president' health care law unconstitutional.
Roberts was willing to draw
that line, but in a way that decided future cases, and not the massive health
care case.
Moreover, there are passages
in Roberts' opinion that are consistent with his views that unelected judges
have assumed too much power over American life, and that courts generally
should take a back seat to elected officials, who are closer to the people and
can be voted out of office if the people don't like what they're doing.
As Roberts explained in his
opinion:
"The framers created a
federal government of limited powers, and assigned to this Court the duty of
enforcing those limits. The Court does so today. But the Court does not express
any opinion on the wisdom of the Affordable Care Act. Under the Constitution,
that judgment is reserved to the people."
Regardless of his thinking, it
was clear to the conservatives that Roberts wanted the court out of the red-hot
dispute.
Roberts had begun to focus on
a different argument to uphold the law and the mandate's penalty by defining it
as a tax. That strained argument had received almost no attention in the lower
courts, which had uniformly rejected it. It was seen as a long-shot by the
law's supporters.
It would have been far easier,
legally, for Roberts to have followed the rationale of two conservatives who
voted to uphold the law in the lower courts: Appeals Court Judges Laurence
Silberman and Jeffrey Sutton.
In separate opinions for the
D.C.- and Cincinnati-based federal courts, Silberman and Sutton wrote that the
mandate had not exceeded Congress' commerce power.
Roberts surely could have
gotten the liberals to join a decision that the mandate was similar to a 1942
Commerce Clause case involving a farmer who was producing wheat for his own use
and had no intention of selling it. In that seminal case, the Court ruled the
farmer's wheat production nonetheless affected Commerce, and Congress therefore
could regulate it.
In the health care case, since
no one was urging the court to overturn that precedent (Wickard v Filburn), the
court could have issued a narrow opinion. It could have ruled that since it
wasn't being asked to depart from settled law, the health care act would stand,
based on prior precedents.
Instead, Roberts focused the
majority opinion on a much more difficult legal proposition: The tax power.
But Roberts also would limit
Congress' authority in future cases under the commerce power.
Roberts then engaged in his
own lobbying effort - trying to persuade at least Justice Kennedy to join his
decision so the Court would appear more united in the case. There was a fair
amount of give-and-take with Kennedy and other justices, the sources said. One
justice, a source said, described it as "arm-twisting."
Even in Roberts' opinion,
which was circulated among the justices in early June, there are phrases that
appear tailored to get Kennedy's vote. Roberts even used some of the same
language that Kennedy used during oral arguments.
During the arguments in March,
Kennedy told Solicitor General Donald Verrilli:
"Here the government is
saying that the federal government has a duty to tell the individual citizen
that it must act, and that is different from what we have in previous cases -
and that changes the relationship of the federal government to the individual
in a very fundamental way."
Roberts wrote in the section
of his opinion analyzing the Commerce Clause:
"Accepting the
government's theory would give Congress the same license to regulate what we do
not do, fundamentally changing the relation between the citizen and the federal
government."
On the surface, Kennedy would
appear to have been Roberts' best shot to persuade. The other three justices -
Thomas, Antonin Scalia and Samuel Alito - are seen as more solidly conservative
and much less susceptible to pressure.
After all, it was Kennedy who
"betrayed" conservatives in 1992, when he flipped his vote in a key
abortion case that could have overturned Roe v. Wade, the landmark decision
that guaranteed a woman's right to abortion.
In the 1992 case, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, Kennedy initially was with conservatives, but then forged
a last-minute alliance with Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and David Souter to
put Roe v. Wade on more solid ground than even the original decision itself.
Kennedy has long frustrated
conservatives, because he occasionally joins with liberals to provide the key
swing vote in cases involving social issues. They openly mock his writing style
as grandiose and his jurisprudence as squishy - in other words, changeable and
too moderate.
That's not entirely fair to
Kennedy. In fact, there are underlying and consistent themes in his
jurisprudence, much more so than in the jurisprudence of O'Connor. Kennedy has
a libertarian streak, and he is skeptical of expansive government power over
individuals. In fact, if there's an issue of an individual versus invasive
government, Kennedy sides with the individual.
As a result, Kennedy supports
the right to possess a firearm for self-defense AND a woman's right in the
context of abortion. He opposes certain laws that discriminate against homosexuals
or restrict a person's freedom of speech.
Kennedy also is strong on
issues of federalism - and is remarkably consistent. His opinion in a 1999
case, Alden v. Maine, is considered one of the Court's finest in that area.
Ruling that states were immune from private lawsuits in state courts, Kennedy
wrote: "Sovereign immunity derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but
from the federal structure of the original Constitution itself."
And in a 1995 term limits
case, when the Court rejected state efforts to impose term limits on Members of
Congress, Kennedy wrote a separate, concurring opinion to make a point about
federalism:
"Federalism was our
nation's own discovery. The framers split the atom of sovereignty . . . It was
the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political capacities,
one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other."
Those structural boundaries,
Kennedy believes, help protect the individual from runaway government power,
and are key components to protecting liberty.
All of that dovetails with
Kennedy's position on the individual mandate in the health care law. Close
associates of Kennedy never thought he would waver in the case once he
recognized the federal mandate as an encroachment on individual liberty (points
Kennedy later would make in his sections of the joint dissent).
In fact, Kennedy was the most
forceful and engaged of all the conservatives in trying to persuade Roberts to
stand firm to strike down the mandate. Two sources confirm that he didn't give
up until the very end.
But Roberts didn't focus
entirely on Kennedy, the sources said. He tried to persuade the conservatives
to join at least the parts of his opinion with which they agreed, such as his
Commerce Clause analysis.
"People, for good reasons
of their own, often fail to do things that would be good for them or good for
society. Those failures - joined with the similar failures of others - can
readily have a substantial effect on interstate commerce," Roberts wrote
in his opinion. "Under the government's logic, that authorizes Congress to
use its commerce power to compel citizens to act as the government would have
them act.
"That is not the country
the framers of our Constitution envision," Roberts wrote.
But despite Roberts' strong
language on the Commerce Clause, the conservatives would have none of it, the
two sources said, even though there was no significant difference in their
reasoning on that issue.
Indeed, since the four
conservatives agreed the mandate went beyond the commerce power, the Court now
has five Justices who would constrain what Congress can do going forward -
imposing significant limits on federal power.
The majority decisions were
due on June 1, and the dissenters set about writing a response, due on June 15.
The sources say they divided up parts of the opinion, with Kennedy and Scalia
doing the bulk of the writing.
The two sources say
suggestions that parts of the dissent were originally Roberts' actual majority
decision for the court are inaccurate, and that the dissent was a true joint
effort.
The fact that the joint
dissent doesn't mention Roberts' majority was not a sign of sloppiness, the
sources said, but instead was a signal the conservatives no longer wished to
engage in debate with him.
The language in the dissent
was sweeping, arguing the court was overreaching in the name of restraint and
ignoring key structural protections in the Constitution. There are clear
elements of Scalia - and then, there is Justice Kennedy.
"The fragmentation of power produced by the structure of our government is central to liberty, and when we destroy it, we place liberty in peril," the dissent said. "Today's decision should have vindicated, should have taught, this truth; instead our judgment today has disregarded it."
No comments:
Post a Comment