By Gareth Porter and Shah Noori
Sharply increased attacks on
US and other international forces personnel by Afghan security forces,
reflecting both infiltration of and Taliban influence on those forces, appear
to have outflanked the US-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command's strategy
for maintaining control of the insurgency.
The Taliban-instigated
"insider attacks", which have already killed 51 NATO troops in 2012 -
already 45% more than in all of 2011 - have created such distrust of the Afghan
National Army (ANA) and national police that the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) command has suspended joint operations by NATO forces
with Afghan security units smaller than the 800-strong battalion of Kandak and
vowed to limit them in the future.
ISAF had intended to carry out
intensive partnering and advising of ANA and police units below battalion level
through 2012 to get them ready to take responsibility for Afghan security. Now,
however, that strategy appears to have been disrupted by the insider attacks,
and Afghan military and civilian officials are seriously concerned.
Secretary of Defense Leon
Panetta sought to minimize the crisis in US war strategy Tuesday by calling the
inside attacks on NATO troops the "last gasp" of a Taliban insurgency
that has been "unable to regain any of the territory that they have
lost". The "last gasp" phrase recalls then Vice-President Dick
Cheney's infamous 2005 claim that the Iraqi insurgency was "in its last
throes".
But General Martin Dempsey,
chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, who has no apparent personal stake in
touting the existing strategy in Afghanistan, called the attacks "a very
serious threat to the campaign" in an interview on Saturday.
"You can't whitewash
it," said Dempsey. "We can't convince ourselves that we just have to
work harder to get through it. Something has to change."
The ISAF command also tried to
downplay the significance of the decision, portraying it as
"temporary" and not unlike previous adjustments to high threat conditions.
The ISAF press release vowed that it would "return to normal operations as
soon as conditions warrant".
But the Taliban have power
over whether conditions return to a level that would allow resumption of the
joint operations between NATO and Afghan forces, which have been touted as the
key to preparing the ANA and the police to cope with the Taliban on their own.
The Taliban have achieved a strategic coup by creating a high degree of US-NATO
fear and mistrust of the Afghan forces.
Even if some joint operations
are resumed, moreover, they will be limited to those approved by regional
commanders, according to the new policy. And White House spokesman Jay Carney
appeared to contradict the ISAF "return to normal operations"
language, telling reporters, "Most partnering and advising will now be at
the battalion level and above."
ISAF Commander General John
Allen has tried in the past to minimize the role of the Taliban in the insider
killings, suggesting that as little as 10% of the Afghan soldiers and police
who killed NATO troops were Taliban infiltrators. Most of the killers acted out
of personal anger at their Western advisers, Allen argued.
But Allen also conceded that,
in addition to Taliban infiltrators, some Afghan troops may have acted out of
"radicalization or having become susceptible to extremist
ideology".
New evidence suggests that the
Taliban had influenced a number of ANA and police who killed NATO personnel.
Last month, the Taliban's media arm released a video showing a Taliban commander
in eastern Kunar province welcoming two ANA soldiers who they said had killed
US and Afghan troops earlier in the year. Based on the video, the Long War
Journal judged that neither of the soldiers had been a Taliban infiltrator but
had made the decision in response to Taliban urging.
Douglas Ollivant, who was senior counterinsurgency adviser to the US commander of the regional command for eastern Afghanistan in 2010 and 2011, told IPS the evidence indicates that most Afghan personnel who killed NATO troops and were not already Taliban when they joined the security forces had later become "de facto infiltrators".
Douglas Ollivant, who was senior counterinsurgency adviser to the US commander of the regional command for eastern Afghanistan in 2010 and 2011, told IPS the evidence indicates that most Afghan personnel who killed NATO troops and were not already Taliban when they joined the security forces had later become "de facto infiltrators".
In the Afghan rural social
context, the local Taliban and the Afghan troops and soldiers "all know
each other", Ollivant said. "It's not like they are from two
different planets."
Lieutenant Colonel Danny
Davis, who traveled extensively across Afghanistan during his 2010-2011 tour of
duty there, found evidence that the Taliban had indeed achieved influence over
the Afghan security forces who were supposed to be helping US-NATO forces root
out the insurgents.
In a draft report he wrote
earlier this year, which had circulated within the US government and was leaked
to Rolling Stone magazine, Davis wrote, "In almost every combat outpost I
visited this year, the troopers reported to me they had intercepted radio or
other traffic between the ANSF and the local Taliban making essentially
mini-nonaggression deals with each other."
In Zharay district of Kandahar
province, Davis wrote, he found the Afghan security forces were "in league
with the Taliban".
Taliban spiritual and political leader Mullah Omar issued a statement August 16 saying the Taliban had "cleverly infiltrated the ranks of the enemy according to the plan given them last year." Omar also called on Afghan security personnel to "defect and joint the Taliban as matter of religious duty".
Taliban spiritual and political leader Mullah Omar issued a statement August 16 saying the Taliban had "cleverly infiltrated the ranks of the enemy according to the plan given them last year." Omar also called on Afghan security personnel to "defect and joint the Taliban as matter of religious duty".
For many months the US has
been putting intense pressure on the Afghan government to prevent such killings
by "revetting" the personnel files of ANA and police personnel. Just
last week, the government announced that it had removed "hundreds" of
security forces from its ranks.
But there is very little the
Afghan government can do to ensure against Afghan troops turning against NATO.
"Vetting is virtually impossible in a place like Afghanistan," former
British commander Colonel Richard Kemp told the Guardian.
There are no detailed files on
the young recruits into the army and police. The only information on the vast
majority of new recruits is a statement from village elders vouching for
them.
Retired Lieutenant Colonel
Anthony Shaffer, senior fellow and director of communications at the Center for
Advanced Defense Studies, told IPS that US officers in Afghanistan don't
believe the Afghan government's efforts to identify potential Taliban
infiltrators or sympathizers will slow the pace of insider killings. "They
are all saying it isn't going to have any effect," said Shaffer.
The decision by ISAF to pull
back from joint operations with smaller Afghan units is regarded by Afghan
officials and observers as a major boost to the Taliban and a potentially
serious blow to the already shaky ANA and police.
Retired ANA General Atiqullah
Amarkhail acknowledged in an interview with IPS that insider attacks "have
destroyed the NATO trust in the Afghan security forces". The halt in joint
operations with Afghan security forces will "really embolden and raise the
morale of the Taliban", he said. "The Taliban consider that they have
achieved the goal they have been working for and are proud that they made
coalition forces stop helping Afghan security forces."
Amarkhail said he doesn't
believe the ANA will be able to conduct operations without the help of NATO
forces, because of poor coordination among Afghan security forces and its lack
of modern weapons.
"If the foreign forces do
not support and leave the Afghan Army in the present condition, things will get
worse," said Amarkhail. He expressed the fear that the result could be
that different elements within the ANA will "turn their guns on each
other".
Dawoud Ahmadi, spokesman for
Helmand Province Governor Mohammad Gulab Mangal, also expressed the fear that
the ANA in the province will not be able to operate effectively against the
Taliban if ISAF halts joint operations with the ANA at lower unit levels.
The spokesman told IPS,
"We have problems in Helmand province, especially in the North. If NATO
doesn't help in conducting operations at lower level, the Afghan security
forces will face problems, because they are not yet ready to launch operations
on their own in that part of the province."
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