Growth in a Time of Debt
Two seemingly
different questions and comments from readers and friends crossed my path the
last few days, but I saw a definite connection between them. The first question
was, Why do we pursue austerity when it seems not to work? And then many
readers wrote to ask this week, What do I think about the real problems that
are surfacing in the Rogoff and Reinhart assertion that debt above a ratio of
90% debt to GDP seems to slow economic growth by 1% (especially since I have
quoted that data more than a few times)? We’ll deal with each question
separately and then see if we can connect the dots.
The first
question comes from correspondence I have had with Ms. Aga Barberini, who works
in the investment world in Milan, Italy. She came there from Poland some 20
years ago. The first part of her note contains the question on austerity, but
I’ll pass along more of her letter, as I think it will give us all some insight
into the seeming chaos that voters are facing in choosing a path for Italy. (And
I hope my editors leave some of the charming grammar in her letter. You can
almost hear the musical tones of her Italian English.)
I am worried for Italy, too. When I came here 20 years ago Italy was
beautiful and rich; it was very good for a girl from Eastern Europe. Nowadays a
lot of Italians go to Poland and settle down.
I guess it’s going to get worse, the austerity will be tighter. Please tell
me why should we go ahead with austerity when IMF last month came out
saying that for every point of tax lifting in Italy we lose 2.5 points of GDP?
First they said that the tax lifting would produce only 0.5 points of GDP slip,
now they say they were wrong.
The political chaos is lasting. My husband says, why don't we vote for the
comedian in June (as it is almost sure we are going to vote again soon)? Sure,
Grillo is right in a lot of things and would clean the politics a lot. (By the
way, did you know that the oldest bank in the world, Monte
dei Paschi di Siena’s mess is reaching 20 billion euros? They took away the money doing ...
the bank transfers ;-) The Banka d'Italia didn't see; CONSOB, the Italian SEC,
didn't see...). But how can a serious person vote for the comedian?
But I say sometimes the one who is good for the revolution isn't
necessarily good to rule the country. Do you remember the guy called Lech
Walesa? Thanks to him the communism [in Poland] was fallen – we all agree.
Polish people were so thankful to him that we appointed him for the first
democratic president. Than we found that he didn't have enough background to
rule the country and enough culture to represent us on the international stage.
I will vote Berlusconi again. I can't stand communists even if they call
themselves “the left.”
(Sidebar:
I was in Siena last summer and visited the ancestral home of the bank mentioned
above, the world’s oldest, founded in 1472. I marveled that any bank could last
so long. At thePalio last summer we met one of the senior managers of
the bank. It turns out that it was local politicians who ran the board
of the bank, and now the authorities are saying management hid the problems
from them.)
Austerity has
come to have a rather bad name of late. The complaint is that it just doesn’t
work. Which is somewhat like complaining that the roof is leaking because
someone else hassn’t fixed it. If by “working” we mean that austerity is
supposed to produce growth, then of course it doesn’t work. By definition,
austerity means you are reducing a fiscal deficit, and doing so will reduce
growth in the short term. That begs the question, why would you want to do
that? Don’t we want growth? Let’s look at why a country might need to endure
austerity.
“Austerity” is
now the name we give to the situation where a government has to limit its
spending during an economic downturn or recession. The governments of the
developed world amassed huge sovereign debts in the course of what is known as
the Debt Supercycle. As interest rates fell, borrowing to finance consumption
and spending became easy. But now that decades-long supercycle has ended.
One way of
looking at the problem of swollen sovereign debt is to tsay that it goes back
to Keynes (although one cannot actually blame the current problems on his
economic theory). Keynes argued (roughly) that when there is a normal
business-cycle recession a government should spend money to counterbalance the
private-economy slowdown. That means that the government should borrow money
and run fiscal deficits to help boost spending and the economy. According to
his theory, this would make the recession not as deep and help bring the
economy back to recovery sooner.
This was tried
after World War II in numerous countries in the developed world, and it seemed
to work. "We are all Keynesians now" is a famous phrase uttered by
Milton Friedman and attributed to US President Richard Nixon. It is popularly
associated with the reluctant embrace of Keynesian economics in a time of
financial crisis, by individuals such as Nixon, who had formerly favored less
interventionist policies. (The phrase was first attributed to Milton Friedman
in the December 31, 1965, edition of Time magazine. In the
February 4, 1966, edition, Friedman wrote a letter clarifying that his original
statement was, "In one sense, we are all Keynesians now; in another,
nobody is any longer a Keynesian.") (Wikipedia)
The problem that
arose was that most countries rarely followed through on the second part of
Keynes’s prescription, which was to pay back the debt when times were good.
Rather, the debt just continued to accumulate. But, because interest rates were
dropping, the size and cost of the debt became less of an issue.
And, as Rogoff
and Reinhart showed through their massive data collection and work on sovereign
debt crises, published in This Time Is Different and
elsewhere, debt is not a problem until it becomes one. And then it reaches a
critical mass and you have what they called the Bang! moment.
I want to review
some of their work, which will help us understand the reasons for austerity,
but first let’s deal with the controversy of the moment. There has been some
considerable debate this week among economists about a paper Rogoff and
Reinhart published after they wrote their book. Recent
detailed work suggests the analysis in that paper is flawed and that there are
actual programming errors in their spreadsheets. My inbox almost exploded the
last two days as friends and colleagues sent me links to multiple sources
talking about the problems with Rogoff and Reinhart’s work and asked for my
thoughts. Given that I find This Time Is Different one of the
more important books of the last decade, let me provide some context.
In 2010,
economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff released a paper, "Growth
in a Time of Debt." Their main result was that “… median
growth rates for countries with public debt over 90 percent of GDP are roughly
one percent lower than otherwise; average (mean) growth rates are several
percent lower." The work suggested that countries with debt-to-GDP ratios
above 90 percent have a slightly negative average growth rate.
This has been
one of the most cited stats in the public debate during the Great
Recession. Paul Ryan's Path to Prosperity budget states that their study
"… found conclusive empirical evidence that [debt] exceeding 90 percent of
the economy has a significant negative effect on economic growth." The Washington
Post editorial board takes the R&R conclusion as an economic
consensus view, stating
that "… debt-to-GDP could keep rising – and stick dangerously near
the 90 percent mark that economists regard as a threat to sustainable economic
growth." (from the Next New Deal site and many other links sent to me)
In a new paper, "Does
High Public Debt Consistently Stifle Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhart
and Rogoff," Thomas Herndon, Michael Ash, and Robert Pollin of the University of
Massachusetts, Amherst successfully replicate the results. After trying to
replicate the Reinhart-Rogoff results and failing, they reached out to Reinhart
and Rogoff, and they were willing to share their data spreadhseet. This allowed
Herndon et al. to see how how Reinhart and Rogoff's data was constructed.
They find that three main issues stand out. First, Reinhart and Rogoff
selectively exclude years of high debt and average growth. Second, they use a
debatable method to weight the countries. Third, there also appears to be a
coding error that excludes high-debt and average-growth countries. All three
bias in favor of their result, and without them you don't get their
controversial result.
(You can get further details at http://www.nextnewdeal.net/rortybomb/researchers-finally-replicated-reinhart-rogoff-and-there-are-serious-problems. And there are
other sources here and here.)
I and many
others who are concerned about the growth of debt quoted that research. As we
approach that 90% level in the US, it has become a prominent feature in certain
circles. But I want to emphasize that The Rogoff and Reinhart paper mentioned above
is a later work than their book. To my knowledge, no one is disputing the work
in their book. Their book, This Time Is Different, is
basically just an analysis of their very large and masterful accumulation of
data about sovereign debt crises.
For the last two
weeks I have talked about economists and their use of data. I pointed out that
inflation as measured by the CPI is an average for the country and not
reflective of any one person’s actual experience.
Something
similar can be said about the later work of Rogoff and Reinhart. Yes, there was
an unfortunate formula in one cell of their rather complex spreadsheet; but
more importantly, they made assumptions about what is important and what is not
in creating their analysis, and the assumptions in their model gave one set of
results. If you make different assumptions, you get other results that show
that 90% is not all that bad. Just as economists argue about how we should
compute inflation, there will now be arguments about what the debt-to-GDP
numbers really mean. I am willing to bet that by this time next year we will
see several studies, all arriving at different conclusions.
But in any case,
whether in their original work or in the later paper, R&R describe a
problem with excessive debt that is true on average. Actual
experience shows that in some countries debt will create a problem at quite low
levels, while Japan climbs toward 250% debt to GDP (and will get there all too
soon) and hardly anyone blinks. Different pokes for different folks.
I’m going to
toss in a quick note as I sit here in Hong Kong waiting for my next plane. I
read the Financial Times while on the way up here from
Singapore. There were several articles that seemed to rejoice in the fact that
Rogoff and Reinhart’s later paper has some flaws. They jumped on those errors
to discredit the whole idea of austerity, the association between too much debt
and a lack of growth, and the need to bring one’s fiscal house into order. Why
pursue austerity when it does not lead to growth, which everyone knows is the
only real way to deal with debt?
You can almost
hear the critics wanting to dismiss Rogoff and Reinhart’s entire book, which
clearly establishes the link between excessive debt and sovereign debt crises –
a pattern that has played out some 266 times over the last few centuries, if I
remember correctly. The point is that there is no magic number that says “This
far and no farther.” There is a mythical line where confidence and trust is
lost, but no one knows where that line of demarcation is until it is crossed.
And right up until the last minute, there are always those who look for ways to
add more debt, who assure us, “This time is different.” But it never is. A
country can restore its fiscal house to order, pay back its
debt, and grow its way out of the problem over time; there are numerous
examples. But continuing to grow that debt-to-GDP number is to court a disaster
that looms right in front of you.
If politicians
want to keep the borrow-and-spend party going “just one more election cycle”
and if no one takes away the punchbowl, the Bang! moment
will most certainly arrive. That is the clear lesson of history. It is almost
irrelevant whether that number is 90% or 120% or 80%. It will be a different
number for each country, depending on the confidence that investors have in the
ability of a country to pay back its debt. Investors in sovereign debt are
almost by definition the most risk-averse investors there are. You do not
invest in a country’s debt to increase your risk exposure; you expect to get
paid. There are other factors at play in determining the critical threshold,
too: What was the purpose of the debt? How fast is the economy growing?
Can Italy, beset
by recession, high unemployment, and a political crisis, grow its debt-to-GDP
to Japan’s 240% level? I think any serious observer would say no. Can it get to
130%? 140%? Maybe. We will not know until it’s too late whether Italy or any
other country (Spain, Japan, France, or the US) has more debt than the market
is willing to absorb. But that is a line any politician should want to avoid
crossing.
To cobble
together an understanding of why Italy needs to deal with austerity – and to
give Aga a good answer – we first need to revisit something I wrote in my own
book, Endgame.One of the most important sections of Endgame is
a chapter in which I review (and compare with other research) This Time
is Different and include part of an interview I did with Rogoff and
Reinhart. This chapter turned into a real economic epiphany for me, because the
R&R data confirms other research about how things seem to go along
swimmingly, and then the end comes all at once – the Bang! moment.
Let’s review a few paragraphs from my book, starting with a paragraph from the
interview I did:
KENNETH ROGOFF: It’s external debt that you owe to foreigners that is
particularly an issue. Where the private debt so often, especially for emerging
markets, but it could well happen in Europe today, where a lot of the private
debt ends up getting assumed by the government, and you say, but the government
doesn’t guarantee private debts, well no they don’t. We didn’t guarantee all
the financial debt either before it happened, yet we do see that. I remember
when I was first working on the 1980’ Latin Debt Crisis and piecing together
the data there on what was happening to public debt and what was happening to
private debt, and I said, gosh the private debt is just shrinking and
shrinking, isn’t that interesting. Then I found out that it was being
“guaranteed” by the public sector, who were in fact assuming the debts to make
it easier to default on.
Now back to the book [quoting Rogoff and Reinhart]:
If there is one common theme to the vast range of crises we consider in
this book, it is that excessive debt accumulation, whether it be by the
government, banks, corporations, or consumers, often poses greater systemic
risks than it seems during a boom. Infusions of cash can make a government look
like it is providing greater growth to its economy than it really is.
Private sector borrowing binges can inflate housing and stock prices far
beyond their long-run sustainable levels, and make banks seem more stable and
profitable than they really are. Such large-scale debt buildups pose risks
because they make an economy vulnerable to crises of confidence, particularly
when debt is short-term and needs to be constantly refinanced. Debt-fueled
booms all too often provide false affirmation of a government’s policies, a
financial institution’s ability to make outsized profits, or a country’s standard
of living. Most of these booms end badly. Of course, debt instruments are
crucial to all economies, ancient and modern, but balancing the risk and
opportunities of debt is always a challenge, a challenge policy makers,
investors, and ordinary citizens must never forget.
And the
following is key. Read it twice (at least!):
Perhaps more than anything else, failure to recognize the precariousness
and fickleness of confidence – especially in cases in which large short-term
debts need to be rolled over continuously – is the key factor that gives rise
to the this-time-is-different syndrome. Highly indebted governments, banks, or
corporations can seem to be merrily rolling along for an extended period, whenbang! –
confidence collapses, lenders disappear, and a crisis hits.
Economic theory tells us that it is precisely the fickle nature of
confidence, including its dependence on the public’s expectation of future
events, which makes it so difficult to predict the timing of debt crises. High
debt levels lead, in many mathematical economics models, to “multiple
equilibria” in which the debt level might be sustained – or might not be.
Economists do not have a terribly good idea of what kinds of events shift
confidence and of how to concretely assess confidence vulnerability. What
one does see, again and again, in the history of financial crises is that when
an accident is waiting to happen, it eventually does. When countries
become too deeply indebted, they are headed for trouble. When debt-fueled asset
price explosions seem too good to be true, they probably are. But the exact
timing can be very difficult to guess, and a crisis that seems imminent can
sometimes take years to ignite.
How confident was the world in October of 2006? John was writing that there
would be a recession, a subprime crisis, and a credit crisis in our future. He
was on Larry Kudlow’s show with Nouriel Roubini, and Larry and John Rutledge
were giving him a hard time about his so-called “doom and gloom.” “If there is
going to be a recession you should get out of the stock market,” was John’s
call. He was a tad early, as the market proceeded to go up another 20% over the
next 8 months. And then the crash came.
But that’s the
point. There is no way to determine when the crisis comes.
As Reinhart and
Rogoff wrote:
Highly indebted governments, banks, or corporations can seem to be merrily
rolling along for an extended period, when bang! – confidence
collapses, lenders disappear, and a crisis hits.
Bang! is the
right word. It is the nature of human beings to assume that the current trend
will work itself out, that things can’t really be that bad. The trend is your
friend … until it ends. Look at the bond markets only a year and then just a
few months before World War I. There was no sign of an impending war. Everyone
“knew” that cooler heads would prevail.
We can look back now and see where we have made mistakes in the current
crisis. We actually believed that this time was different, that we had better
financial instruments, smarter regulators, and were so, well, modern. Times
were different. We knew how to deal with leverage. Borrowing against your home
was a good thing. Housing values would always go up. Etc.
Until they didn’t, and then it was too late. What were we thinking? Of
course, we were thinking in accordance with our oh-so-human natures. It is all
so predictable, except for the exact moment when the crisis hits. (And during
the run-up we get all those wonderful quotes from market actors, which then
come back to haunt them.)
Countries and
governments, small and large, can go into debt for numerous reasons. As noted
above, Keynes advocated going into debt during business contractions. But
there are different types of debt.
There is debt
that is used to build productive assets such as roads, airports, bridges,
schools, and civic centers.
Then there is
debt that is used for current consumption. When debt creates assets, future
generations at least get some benefit when they have to participate in paying
the loan back. In the case of current consumption, they get none. In essence,
debt applied to consumption is spending today rather than spending in the
future. You are borrowing money to spend on goods and services in the “now,”
with the promise to pay for that consumption later.
Next week, if
all goes right, I am going to borrow money to buy two apartments in a high-rise
in Dallas that will become, after we do a little remodeling, my future home. I
will get an asset that I hope to pay off in about ten years. If I am lucky,
that asset will then be worth more than I paid for it.
That is
different from borrowing money to go on a vacation or to buy food or other
goods that will have no future value.
But borrowing
against the future is what Italy has essentially done, Aga. Just like other
countries all over the world, Italy borrowed for consumption and ran up a
rather large debt. And then the crisis came, and lenders were not as willing to
provide Italy money at low rates. That is the nature of investors who buy
government bonds: if they perceive higher risk, they want higher rates.
The crisis
arrived, and Italy lost cheap access to the bond market. The ECB had to step in
and begin to buy bonds to lower their rates. But Italy had to promise to lower
its deficits, and the way to do that is called austerity.
Italy is in a
currency union called the Eurozone. A currency union cannot allow its members
to run up debts beyond what the market is willing to finance, or the whole
currency union will collapse. The central bank (in this case the ECB) can only
print so much money before inflation and valuation becomes an issue. If the ECB
allows Italy to run whatever debt it wants to, then it must allow everyone else
the same privilege.
Eurozone
officials may elect to help a smaller state like Greece paper over some of its
problems, but at the end of the day countries must be able to handle their own
debts you are going to keep your currency union up and running.
Italy must deal
with austerity because if they don’t they will lose access to the bond market.
They ran up a huge debt and now must figure out how to pay it back. They
borrowed money to spend, on the pledge that future generations would pay for
it. Unfortunately, the future is now.
Yes, Germany and
other countries could lend the Italians money, but they have their own
problems. Egan Jones, the only truly independent rating agency, downgraded
Germany this week. The Dutch too are having “issues,” as my kids would say.
Europe in general seems to be slipping into recession.
Some would argue
that the ECB should just fire up the presses and print money, as Japan is going
to do. Outright monetization. But that approach is highly problematic. Why
should Finland want to see that happen if they are not also running large
deficits? What about countries with lower debt ratios? The documents everyone
signed when they joined the euro dictated that each country would be
responsible for its own debt and that the ECB would not monetize debt.
It is one thing
for a country to fall on hard times and for its fellow currency-union members
to agree to help, but it is another thing to make that help open-ended. Italy
has come a long way toward getting back to a sustainable fiscal situation in
the last few years. I know it has been hard. I have always maintained that
Italy has its own fate in its own hands. Aga, if you just cut the number of
cars and drivers you provide to every small-time politician, you could
eliminate about 20% of your deficit. Everyone in Italy knows there is a lot of
waste and corruption. That is why a comedian like Grillo can get almost 25% of
the vote!
The
neo-Keynesians are right about this. In the short term, austerity will result
in less growth. All but the mathematically challenged will agree with that. The
scholarly literature seems to suggest that the short term is about 4-5
quarters, but that estimate is based on averages for a number of countries.
Whether the actual interval is longer or shorter, it means that austerity will
not produce growth in the short term. And if you have to cut 1-2% a year for
several years, then that means little or no growth for those years. But the
reason you have to do it is that you did not reduce your debt during the good
times.
Austerity is a
consequence, not a punishment. A country loses access to cheap borrowed money
as a consequence of running up too much debt and losing the confidence of
lenders that the debt can be repaid. Lenders don’t sit around in clubs and
discuss how to “punish” a country by requiring austerity; they simply decide
not to lend. Austerity is a result of a country’s trying to entice lenders into
believing that the country will change and make an effort to restore
confidence.
If Italy or any
other country does not inspire confidence, then it must suffer the consequences
when it loses access to the credit markets. Sure, the ECB or the IMF could lend
you money, but their members are essentially investors as well. If there was
unlimited money available, I can think of a country or two that might choose to
run 10% and then 20% deficits. Why choose to tax when you can borrow and not
repay? That is what politicians would all love to be able to promise.
Argentina has
pursued such a policy for almost a century. After multiple devaluations, their
currency is now a fraction of one billionth of a cent of what it was 100 years
ago. It is rather hard to operate as an investor or businessperson in such an
environment. One of the reasons why Italians wanted to get into the euro, Aga,
was to take away from your politicians the opportunity to run up large debts
and then devalue. The lira was a byword for fleeting value, not a currency for
long-term investment.
You avoid
austerity by not borrowing and consuming in the first place. After the market
loses confidence, your choices are rather stark. If you default, then you are
clearly out of the market for some time and suffer a very quick and deep
recession as the government loses its ability to pay the salaries of government
workers, provide healthcare, etc. If you elect to try to keep borrowing, you
will have to implement a change in policy that will restore confidence – or
find someone who will lend you money on better terms. Bluntly speaking, Germany
and the EU might do that for Italy for a while but not unless they see the
country actually controlling its deficit.
The problem
Italy now faces is that any government that is elected will have to make hard
choices. Trying to reverse the austerity already agreed to will almost
certainly result in loss of access to the bond market. Is it possible to
develop a plan to cut spending at a slower pace? Sure, if you can get the rest
of the EU to agree, at the same time that Spain, Portugal, Greece (and soon
France) all want the same policies.
If Italy were in
control of its currency, might it make sense to print a little in the meantime,
as the US, Great Britain, and Japan are doing? There is certainly a school of
thought that says yes. But in a currency union of multiple countries that are
all at different places on the economic journey, it is almost impossible to
have a one-size-fits-all monetary policy. If the spigot is opened for Spain,
Italy, et al., then Germany and others get inflation. That is a tough sell to
German and Finnish voters (among others).
You cannot force
the rest of Europe to fund your deficits. You can negotiate with them to try to
lessen the severity of the crisis, but there is no pain-free path ahead from
where Italy is today, Aga. Your debt to GDP is 126% and rising. Without ECB
support, you would have already lost access to the bond market. If you want to
stay in the euro, you just have to deal with it.
By the way,
leaving the euro would be a VERY expensive option. The “new lira” would drop in
value like a stone in Lake Como (Italy’s deepest lake, for those not familiar
with it, and one of the most beautiful lakes in the world). The cost of
borrowing would skyrocket. The banks would be bankrupt overnight, requiring
massive infusions of new currency that would further drive the lira down. You
are frustrated with politicians now, Aga? What would it be like in the chaos of
a depression? No one can manage well in such an environment. There would be no
good choices, only a choice among disasters.
Tiny Cyprus
might choose in the next few weeks to exit the euro. With bank accounts frozen
and the economy shutting down, they might feel they have no choice. Pay close
attention to what happens; it will not be pretty. (As an aside, I am seriously
tempted to go to Cyprus in late June, just to see the country firsthand. I will
be in Europe between speaking gigs and have not yet decided where to go.)
Italy must first
of all choose a government. Cleaning up its political corruption and wasteful
spending would be a good move, but even clean new politicians (if there is such
a thing) will be faced with the same economic choices. Which, I should note, is
roughly the same choice voters everywhere are faced with.
The US is also
approaching an uncomfortably high debt level. It was less than ten years ago
that I was writing about what the US investment market would look like with no
government debt. Yes, that possibility now seems a distant memory, but we were
paying down the US debt that fast. And then came the Iraq war and larger
deficits and a Republican Congress that got drunk on spending increases. Cheney
told them that deficits don’t matter, and they took it to heart. They doubled down
on debt.
If the US had
entered the 2008 crisis with little or no debt, we could have spent that $1
trillion a year (or even several trillion and made Krugman and McCulley
ecstatic), and no one would have really cared, from a total debt perspective.
(We would have cared what the money was spent on). But we didn’t. We squandered
our surplus with new programs and spending. We borrowed and consumed. We wasted
the good times by running up even more debt. And now we are close to paying a
price.
So, Aga, I don’t
have any easy words for you, but I do think Italy will pull through. I will
visit your country again and again in the future, because I love Tuscany. But
if you can take comfort in the company of others in similar situations, then
there are a host of countries in the developed world that are going to have to
face austerity in one form or another. That is just what happens when you reach
the end of the Debt Supercycle. You are no longer left with merely difficult
choices; they are more like very tough, bad, and disastrous. The worst choice
is not dealing with the problems as soon as possible. I only hope my own
country can make the difficult choices soon, before we too are faced with a
crisis.
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