Germany holds all the cards in the euro
power struggle
By Cyrus Sanati
The faster Europe realizes that Germany
holds most, if not all, of the cards when it comes to ending the eurozone debt
crisis, the faster a lasting solution can be found. With positive economic
growth, low unemployment and fantastically low interest rates, Germany is
simply in no rush to implement reforms that have been proposed by its
economically weaker neighbors, as they would negatively impact Germany's
ability to borrow cheaply and expand exports.
The only way the EU's biggest member can
be convinced to take on reforms, like issuing eurobonds, would be if it were
granted incentives, such as control over the fiscal policy of the eurozone.
Other members of the eurozone, namely France, have been wary about handing more
of their economic power over to Brussels and ultimately to Frankfurt. But while
solutions like the pooling of eurozone's existing debt is a good first step to
diffusing the crisis, they still require incentives for Germany to get on board.
Since the start of the crisis, Germany's
chancellor Angela Merkel has been accused of dragging her feet when it comes to
ending the eurozone crisis. Headlines like, "Where is Germany?" or
"Merkel's failure to lead," have graced newspapers on both sides of
the Atlantic.
But unlike nearly every other eurozone leader,
Merkel hasn't been thrown out of power since the crisis began more than two
year ago. While that is due in part to election rules in Germany, it is also
due to Germany's economy, which, while a little wobbly now, has actually
improved since the crisis began in 2010. That year, Germany's GDP grew at 3.5%
- much faster than its neighbors. In 2011, it grew at 2.7% at the same time
most of its neighbors slipped into recession. And while economists had
predicted a terrible first quarter for Germany this year, its economy actually
grew five times more than expected, at 0.5%.
That might seem puzzling given that many
of Germany's main trading partners are crippled eurozone members, but the
country seems to have benefitted greatly from the weakening of the euro, since
it has increased the competitiveness of its exports in non-eurozone countries.
Unlike the rest of the eurozone, Germany is an exporting powerhouse, making
high-quality goods that are in demand across the world. The eurozone crisis has
ironically only increased its export strength, continuing to make it the
world's second-largest export economy in the world, behind China.
At the same time, Germany has also
benefitted from an increase in investor demand for its debt. Germany has a
debt-to-GDP ratio of around 80%, which is higher than troubled Spain at 68%,
yet its debt is trading at zero, while Spain's debt is trading near 7%. Demand
for German debt was so great this month that at some points it actually traded
at a negative yield. Investors buying this debt range from German banks to U.S.
pension funds. But the big surge in buying lately has come from Spanish and
Greek depositors who are frantically withdrawing their life savings and putting
them in German bonds on fear that their respective governments will leave the
eurozone and destroy their savings through devaluation.
The low interest rates and the strong
economy have translated to a record low unemployment rate for Germany,
post-unification, of 5.6%. Gone are the days where 10% unemployment was the
norm – if you don't have a job in Germany these days, you just aren't looking
hard enough. Compare that with France, which has an unemployment rate that is
almost double that of Germany at 10% or Spain, which is nearly five times
higher at 25%.
There are many structural reasons why
Germany is experiencing economic growth while its neighbors are floundering.
But the point here is that Germany, despite the fire burning around it, is
doing pretty darn well economically. So would you blame chancellor Merkel for
not trying to rock the boat here?
A coalition of eurozone members - led by
France, Spain and Italy - is pushing Germany to agree to the creation of a
common debt instrument for the eurozone, known as a eurobond, in an effort to
stabilize borrowing rates for member nations. The pressure has increased now
that France is led by a socialist government in favor of deficit spending. The
hope is that a common debt instrument will allow weaker members to borrow at
low rates to fund projects meant to stimulate economic growth and stabilize the
euro's value.
Germany doesn't disagree with that
assertion – it just doesn't see any upside in going along with the plan. Let's
take a look at what eurobonds could do here. First, they would most likely
stabilize and strengthen the euro against other currencies. While that would be
good for the international currency markets, it would hurt Germany's export
industry. Second, eurobonds would make it easier for countries with poor credit
ratings to borrow at cheaper rates. This is done by extending the good credit
of the core members to those on the periphery with bad credit. As one of two
AAA-rated countries in the eurozone, the other being Finland, Germany will
undoubtedly see a downgrade in its credit rating if eurobonds were issued,
translating to higher borrowing costs at home. And lastly, eurobonds would
allow France to borrow more money at lower rates, which will go to fund its
budget deficit as well as grand projects to stimulate its weak and inefficient
economy. Again, this benefits Germany how?
Another, less severe, proposal that has
been making the rounds in Brussels would be the pooling of all eurozone debt
into a common fund, which would be paid down by all members over 25 years. This
idea seems to be an even worse alternative to eurobonds as it solves the past
debt problem but does nothing to fix the fiscal inefficiencies and budget
deficits that plague nearly all eurozone members. This would be a good first
step to ending the crisis, but it isn't the cure. In a few years the eurozone
will be back just where they started, only with a larger overall debt burden
and weaker credit. At that point not even Germany could save the euro.
France and the rest of the eurozone need
to wake up. There is no way Germany will ever agree to the pooling of eurozone
debt or to the issuing of eurobonds if it won't have a say in how member states
run their budgets. This crisis has dragged on so long because the two sides of
this issue have been starring at each other hoping that the other side would
blink. The periphery, which now includes France, wants the crisis to get so bad
that the common currency would be near collapse, which would then force Germany
to relent and bailout the continent. On the other side of the table, Germany is
hoping that austerity and weak economic growth gets so bad that the larger
members of the euro finally relent and give up some, if not all, of their
fiscal power to an EU body, which will ultimately be dominated by prudent
German technocrats.
Germany seems to be holding strong as it
knows that it can continue orchestrating piecemeal bailouts of the periphery
with the IMF and the ECB to make sure that the euro doesn't collapse. In the
meantime, it will continue to benefit from the troubles in the eurozone. On the
other hand, it looks like many members of the periphery are about to blink.
Spain's prime minister, an advocate of eurobonds, said this week that he would
now be in favor of transferring some sovereign fiscal power over to the EU.
That leaves just France and Italy to get on board. The quicker they acquiesce
to Berlin, the quicker they can get their eurobonds.
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