Why
Wall Street Wants Larry Summers (and Why the Rest of Us Should Not)
On the surface the debate about the Chairmanship of the Federal Reserve is
about the merits of the two leading candidates, Lawrence Summers and Janet
Yellen. But looks can be deceiving. President Obama leans toward Summers not on
the merits but because the Wall Street bankers want him. Summers is one of the
boys, and the bankers know that Summers will do their bidding, at the expense
of everybody else.
Obama has declared that the two candidates' attitudes to inflation and
unemployment are his main concern, entirely glossing over the fact that the Fed
oversees and regulates the US banking system. Our recent near-death experience
under Alan Greenspan's anti-regulation Fed chairmanship, aided and abetted by
the deregulation pushed by Summers, should cause the President to think hard
about banking regulation. Yet Obama and his tight-knit circle of advisors,
almost all of whom are from Wall Street, are apparently too beholden to Wall
Street to contemplate any serious regulation of an industry that continues to
be out of control.
On the merits, Janet Yellen is the obvious candidate. For six years, 2004
to 2010, she was President of the San Francisco Fed. She is Deputy Chair of the
Federal Reserve Board and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors.
Her academic record is exemplary and distinguished. Her leadership of the Fed
was widely admired, while Summers' Presidency of Harvard ended in a debacle.
Yellen correctly foresaw the risks of the 2008 financial meltdown, while
Summers famously missed it. She, not Summers, has hands-on experience running
the Fed.
Moreover, she has not played the revolving door by cashing in on government
service for personal wealth. That, of course, is why she is suspect on Wall
Street. Yellen has proven herself to be less interested in her personal wealth
than in her nation's monetary policy. For that reason, Wall Street leaders view
her as dangerous.
Summers, on the other hand, is safe and reliable, the bankers' best friend
in politics. From the bankers' point of view, his record is perfect. Summers
late 1990s' advocacy of financial deregulation is of course legendary. In the
Obama years, he championed the bank bailouts while also fighting attempts to
cap the bankers' bonuses and to set limits on risky bank behavior, including
Summers' opposition to the Volcker rule to limit banks from trading on their
own account.
Summers not only shot down proposals by Senator Dodd and others to limit
Wall Street bonuses, but took an even more audacious stand: that the AIG unit
that helped trigger the entire calamity by writing reckless credit default
swaps should also get their mega-bonuses after the fact. Summers explained to a
shocked nation that he did not want to "violate the contracts" of
these employees, even as the world economy lay in ruins at their handiwork.
Even Gordon Gekko would not have had such audacity.
When Summers left the Obama White House, he made a beeline back to Wall
Street, just as he had done after leaving the Treasury in 2001. In a normal
moral universe, a leading candidate for the Fed Chairmanship would hesitate to
pass through the Washington-Wall Street revolving door so quickly and boldly,
for fear of triggering public concerns about financial conflict of interest.
Yet Summers quickly took up not just one Wall Street position but many,
including with DE Shaw, Citigroup, NASDAQ, and other companies.
As Summers' colleague and former Harvard dean Harry Lewis has recently noted,
Summers did all of this while being a full-time professor with the limited
right to consult "one day per week." Moreover, Lewis describes how
Summers' lucrative consultancies reflect a persistent pattern in which Summers
has shown a completely dismissive attitude towards financial ethics and
financial conflict of interest.
When a Harvard colleague of Summers was caught in a financial conflict of
interest, Summers, shrugged it off under oath (at the time he was President of
the University): "In Washington I wasn't ever smart enough to predict them
[ethics rules] … things that seemed ethical to me were thought of as very
problematic and things that seemed quite problematic to me were thought of as
perfectly fine." Summers testified that in his view, "there was no
aura of wrongness of any kind [in the US Treasury] that would be associated
with providing advice on a financial issue in which one had an interest."
Unseemly, yes. Problematic for Summers' public credibility as a bank
regulator? You bet. A problem for Obama to select Summers as Fed chair? Sadly
not. The Administration has long ago blurred any boundaries between itself and
Wall Street....
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