Τhe Triumph of Crony Capitalism
by David Stockman
The triumph of crony capitalism occurred on October 3rd, 2008. The event
was the enactment of TARP — the single greatest economic-policy abomination
since the 1930s, or perhaps ever.
Like most other quantum leaps in statist intervention, the Wall Street
bailout was justified as a last-resort exercise in breaking the rules to save
the system. In the immortal words of George W. Bush, our most economically
befuddled President since FDR, "I've abandoned free market principles in
order to save the free market system."
Based on the panicked advice of Paulson and Bernanke, of course, the
president had the misapprehension that without a bailout "this sucker is
going down." Yet 30 months after the fact, evidence that the American
economy had been on the edge of a nuclear-style meltdown is nowhere to be
found.
In fact, the only real difference with Iraq is that in the campaign against
Saddam we found no weapons of mass destruction; by contrast, in the campaign to
save the economy we actually used them — or at least their economic equivalent.
Still, the urban legend persists that in September 2008 the payments system
was on the cusp of crashing, and that absent the bailouts, companies would have
missed payrolls, ATMs would have gone dark and general financial disintegration
would have ensued.
But the only thing that even faintly hints of this fiction is the
commercial-paper market dislocation. Upon examination, however, it is evident
that what actually evaporated in this sector was not the cash needed for
payrolls, but billions in phony book profits, which banks had previously
obtained through yield-curve arbitrages that were now violently unwinding.
At that time, the commercial-paper market was about $2 trillion and was
heavily owned by institutional money-market funds — including First Reserve,
which was the granddaddy with about $60 billion in footings. Most of this was
rock solid, but its portfolio also included a moderate batch of Lehman
commercial paper — a performance enhancer designed to garner a few extra
"bips" of yield.
As it happened, this foolish exposure to a de facto hedge fund, which had
been leveraged 30-to-1, resulted in the humiliating disclosure that First
Reserve "broke the buck," and that the somnolent institutional fund
managers who were its clients would suffer a loss — — all of 3 percent!
This should have been a "so what" moment — except then all of the
other lemming institutions who were actually paying fees to money-market funds
for the privilege of getting return-free risk decided to panic and demand
redemption of their deposits. This further step in the chain reaction basically
meant that some maturing commercial paper could not be rolled over due to these
money-market redemptions.
But this outcome, too, was a "so what": nowhere was it written
that GE Capital or the Bank One credit-card conduit, to pick two heavy users of
the space, had a Federal entitlement to cheap commercial paper — so that they
could earn fat spreads on their loan books.
Regardless, the nation's number one crony capitalist — Jeff Immelt of GE —
jumped on the phone to Secretary Paulsen and yelled "fire"! Soon the
Fed and FDIC stopped the commercial-paper unwind dead in its tracks by
essentially nationalizing the entire market. Even a cursory look at the data,
however, shows that Immelt's SOS call was a self-serving crock.
First, about $1 trillion of the $2 trillion in outstanding commercial paper
was of the so-called ABCP type — paper backed by packages of consumer loans
such as credit cards, auto loans, and student loans. The ABCP issuers were
off-balance sheet conduits of commercial banks and finance companies; the
latter originated the primary loans, and then scalped profits up front by
selling these loan packages into their own conduits.
In short, had every single ABCP conduit been liquidated for want of
commercial-paper funding — and over the past three years most have been — not a
single consumer would have been denied a credit-card authorization or car loan.
His or her bank would have merely booked the loan as an on-balance sheet asset
— rather than off-balance sheet asset.