A Brief Guide To The Euro
Crisis
By Jeff Harding
There are several things that you need to know about
the eurozone crisis and Wednesday’s Summit agreement:
1. It isn’t over.
2.
The European
Monetary Union’s (EMU) “architecture” is a failure.
3.
They spent too
much and can’t possibly repay the debt.
4.
Banks will need to
be bailed out.
5. They will print money.
In order to understand the EU summit “breakthrough” we
need to understand how the players in eurozone look at it. Last week a leaked
confidential assessment of the problem that was prepared by the IMF was
published by Linkiesta’s Fabrizio Goria. The document revealed the IMF’s private assessment of
Greece and the requirements for a bailout. We were tipped off to the document
by our friends at TrumanFactor.com. The complete document can be found here.
Here is a summary of how the IMF sees the problem:
1.
[T]he Greek
economy is increasingly adjusting through recession and related wage-price
channels, rather than through structural reform-driven increases in
productivity. This is due to “administrative capacity limitations in the Greek
government” which is a diplomatic way of saying that the Greek government can’t
pull off the reforms.
2.
In keeping with
experience to date under the program, it is assumed that Greece will take
longer to implement structural reforms, and that a longer timeframe is
necessary for them to yield “macroeconomic dividends” (i.e., economic growth).
They paint a dismal picture as Greece falls into a severe recession.
3.
Greece won’t raise
as much money as projected through privatization of public assets. Through
2020, total privatization proceeds would amount to €46 billion, instead of the
€66 billion assumed.
4.
They assume that
Greece will run fiscal surpluses starting in 2013 but note that it
requires “sustained and unwavering commitment to fiscal prudence by the Greek
authorities.”
5.
They won’t be able
to return to private markets to finance their debt until after 2020. This will
require “official financing” (i.e., a bailout from the solvent eurozone
members) of €252 billion through 2020.
6.
They are very
concerned that Greece will not meet these targets because their economy and
government is not robust enough to withstand economic shocks (low growth, high
interest rates), thus throwing off the entire projection on which the bailout
is based. If this occurs, then Greece may not be able to go back to the markets
to refinance its debt until 2027.
7.
In order for
Greece to have “sustainable” debt levels, the following needs to happen:
1.
Generous official
support (up to €440 billion under the worst case scenario), and
2.
At least a 50%
haircut to their debt, which requires cooperation from its private bank
creditors. This would get Greece down to a debt level of 120% of GDP by 2020.
Under the worst case scenarios, they see the debt level rising to 208% of GDP.
8.
Another
requirement is €30 billion of support for creditor banks to recapitalize.
As you can see, these policy conclusions are based on
assumptions that someone in the IMF just made up (they understand this). Like
all projections, especially ones going out more than a few years, they are
fictions and are impossible to verify or have any confidence in. Yet … if
you look at these assumptions, this is what the Summit participants are basing
their agreement on.
Here is what happened Wednesday at the Summit.