Why Do Intellectuals Oppose Capitalism?
Noting that “wordsmith intellectuals” are disproportionately likely to lean left, Nozick attributes their animosity towards capitalism to the difference in value judgments and reward structure between formal schools and capitalist society at large.
By R. Nozick
Not all intellectuals are on the “left.” Like other
groups, their opinions are spread along a curve. But in their case, the curve
is shifted and skewed to the political left.
By intellectuals, I do not mean all people of
intelligence or of a certain level of education, but those who, in their vocation,
deal with ideas as expressed in words, shaping the word flow others receive.
These wordsmiths include poets, novelists, literary critics, newspaper and
magazine journalists, and many professors. It does not include those who
primarily produce and transmit quantitatively or mathematically formulated
information (the numbersmiths) or those working in visual media, painters,
sculptors, cameramen. Unlike the wordsmiths, people in these occupations do not
disproportionately oppose capitalism. The wordsmiths are concentrated in
certain occupational sites: academia, the media, government bureaucracy.
Wordsmith intellectuals fare well in capitalist
society; there they have great freedom to formulate, encounter, and propagate
new ideas, to read and discuss them. Their occupational skills are in demand,
their income much above average. Why then do they disproportionately oppose
capitalism? Indeed, some data suggest that the more prosperous and successful
the intellectual, the more likely he is to oppose capitalism. This opposition
to capitalism is mainly “from the left” but not solely so. Yeats, Eliot, and
Pound opposed market society from the right.
The opposition of wordsmith intellectuals to
capitalism is a fact of social significance. They shape our ideas and images of
society; they state the policy alternatives bureaucracies consider. From
treatises to slogans, they give us the sentences to express ourselves. Their
opposition matters, especially in a society that depends increasingly upon the
explicit formulation and dissemination of information.
We can distinguish two types of explanation for the
relatively high proportion of intellectuals in opposition to capitalism. One
type finds a factor unique to the anti-capitalist intellectuals. The second
type of explanation identifies a factor applying to all intellectuals, a force
propelling them toward anti-capitalist views. Whether it pushes any particular
intellectual over into anti-capitalism will depend upon the other forces acting
upon him. In the aggregate, though, since it makes anti-capitalism more likely
for each intellectual, such a factor will produce a larger proportion of
anti-capitalist intellectuals. Our explanation will be of this second type. We
will identify a factor which tilts intellectuals toward anti-capitalist
attitudes but does not guarantee it in any particular case.
THE VALUE OF INTELLECTUALS
Intellectuals now expect to be the most highly valued
people in a society, those with the most prestige and power, those with the
greatest rewards. Intellectuals feel entitled to this. But, by and large, a
capitalist society does not honor its intellectuals. Ludwig von Mises explains
the special resentment of intellectuals, in contrast to workers, by saying they
mix socially with successful capitalists and so have them as a salient
comparison group and are humiliated by their lesser status. However, even those
intellectuals who do not mix socially are similarly resentful, while merely
mixing is not enough—the sports and dancing instructors who cater to the rich
and have affairs with them are not noticeably anti-capitalist.
Why then do contemporary intellectuals feel entitled
to the highest rewards their society has to offer and resentful when they do
not receive this? Intellectuals feel they are the most valuable people, the
ones with the highest merit, and that society should reward people in accordance
with their value and merit. But a capitalist society does not satisfy the
principle of distribution “to each according to his merit or value.” Apart from
the gifts, inheritances, and gambling winnings that occur in a free society,
the market distributes to those who satisfy the perceived market-expressed
demands of others, and how much it so distributes depends on how much is
demanded and how great the alternative supply is. Unsuccessful businessmen and
workers do not have the same animus against the capitalist system as do the
wordsmith intellectuals. Only the sense of unrecognized superiority, of
entitlement betrayed, produces that animus.
Why do wordsmith intellectuals think they are most
valuable, and why do they think distribution should be in accordance with
value? Note that this latter principle is not a necessary one. Other
distributional patterns have been proposed, including equal distribution,
distribution according to moral merit, distribution according to need. Indeed,
there need not be any pattern of distribution a society is aiming to achieve,
even a society concerned with justice. The justice of a distribution may reside
in its arising from a just process of voluntary exchange of justly acquired
property and services. Whatever outcome is produced by that process will be
just, but there is no particular pattern the outcome must fit. Why, then, do
wordsmiths view themselves as most valuable and accept the principle of
distribution in accordance with value?
From the beginnings of recorded thought, intellectuals
have told us their activity is most valuable. Plato valued the rational faculty
above courage and the appetites and deemed that philosophers should rule;
Aristotle held that intellectual contemplation was the highest activity. It is
not surprising that surviving texts record this high evaluation of intellectual
activity. The people who formulated evaluations, who wrote them down with
reasons to back them up, were intellectuals, after all. They were praising
themselves. Those who valued other things more than thinking things through
with words, whether hunting or power or uninterrupted sensual pleasure, did not
bother to leave enduring written records. Only the intellectual worked out a
theory of who was best.
THE SCHOOLING OF INTELLECTUALS
What factor produced feelings of superior value on the
part of intellectuals? I want to focus on one institution in particular:
schools. As book knowledge became increasingly important, schooling—the
education together in classes of young people in reading and book
knowledge—spread. Schools became the major institution outside of the family to
shape the attitudes of young people, and almost all those who later became
intellectuals went through schools. There they were successful. They were
judged against others and deemed superior. They were praised and rewarded, the
teacher’s favorites. How could they fail to see themselves as superior? Daily,
they experienced differences in facility with ideas, in quick-wittedness. The
schools told them, and showed them, they were better.
The schools, too, exhibited and thereby taught the
principle of reward in accordance with (intellectual) merit. To the
intellectually meritorious went the praise, the teacher’s smiles, and the
highest grades. In the currency the schools had to offer, the smartest
constituted the upper class. Though not part of the official curricula, in the
schools the intellectuals learned the lessons of their own greater value in
comparison with the others, and of how this greater value entitled them to
greater rewards.
The wider market society, however, taught a different
lesson. There the greatest rewards did not go to the verbally brightest. There
the intellectual skills were not most highly valued. Schooled in the lesson
that they were most valuable, the most deserving of reward, the most entitled
to reward, how could the intellectuals, by and large, fail to resent the
capitalist society which deprived them of the just deserts to which their
superiority “entitled” them? Is it surprising that what the schooled
intellectuals felt for capitalist society was a deep and sullen animus that,
although clothed with various publicly appropriate reasons, continued even when
those particular reasons were shown to be inadequate?