While this kind of 'wealth tax' has been predicted, as we noted yesterday,
this stunning move in Cyprus is likely only the beginning of this process (which seems
only stoppable by social unrest now). To get a sense of both what just happened
and what its implications are, RBS has put toegther an excellent summary of everything you
need to know about what the Europeans did, why they did it, what the short- and
medium-term market reaction is likely to be, and the big picture of this
"toxic policy error." As RBS summarizes, "the deal to
effectively haircut Cypriot deposits is an unprecedented move
in the Euro crisis and highlights the limits of solidarity and the raw
economics that somebody has to pay. It is also the most dangerous
gambit that EMU leaders have made to date." And so we await
Europe's open and what to expect as the rest of the PIIGSy Banks get plundered.
The deal to
effectively haircut Cypriot deposits is an unprecedented move in the Euro
crisis and highlights the limits of solidarity and the raw economics that
somebody has to pay. It is also the most dangerous gambit that EMU leaders have
made to date.
- What did they do? Hit depositors.
- Why did they do it? Politics,
economics, and because they think they can get away with it.
- Cyprus needs to vote on
this and any delay of opening the banks on Tuesday is more risk-off.
- Short term market
reaction: Risk-off. The situation is fluid but watch politics, Cyprus bank
runs risk, weak periphery banks impact and rating agencies. Worst case
scenario? EMU exit talk. The Best case scenario? Germany is correct and
the ECB bridges the time to when this is clear.
- Big picture: This is toxic and a
policy error.
- Long bunds, sell the
euro, sell periphery, Spain could underperform Italy, but nobody in the
periphery wins.
1. What did they
do?
In the early hours
of this weekend, the Troika decided to impose an effective haircut to both
uninsured and even more interestingly insured (<€100k) Cypriot bank
deposits. More precisely, the €10bn bank rescue in Cyprus will end up with a
bail-in on junior bondholders and a one-time tax on depositors. Deposits below
€100k will be taxed 6.75%, and those above at 9.9%, for a total contribution of
€5.8bn. Depositors will receive bank equity as compensation and the Cypriot
President has offered Gas-linked notes if deposits are kept in the country for
two years.
In addition, the
Eurogroup expects the Russian government to come to an agreement with Cyprus
soon to make a contribution to the rescue.
The Eurogroup
head, Dutchman Jeroen Dijsselbloem, has refused to rule out that Cyprus will be
the last instance where deposit holders get hit. Olli Rehn however has ruled
this out by saying Cyprus is unique. The difference is that Mr Dijsselbloem
represents the views of national finance ministers and leaders.
2. Why did they do
it?
There is an excess
debt problem and somebody has to pay. The division of costs is a policy choice.
The typical choices
beyond growth and inflation, are via (a) getting friendly foreigners to pay
such as Germany/EFSF/ESM etc; (b) getting wealthy domestics to pay (c) forcing
the debtor nation to make good the loans over time through austerity; and (d)
force losses on creditors such as the expropriation of SNS Reaal subordinated
bonds, losses on Anglo Irish senior bonds, OSI, and of course PSI.
The signal is on
the limits of core solidarity
The haircut on the
deposit base in Cyprus is unique in hitting the most secure ladder in bank
capital, when Cypriot government bonds and senior bank paper are still planned
to be made whole. That policy choice was unexpected. One key message is that
the decision represents visible evidence of the limits of core EMU solidarity.
In truth, this was already evident via the ESM’s seniority and the CACs in 1y+
new government bonds.
...and the limits
of the economics
According to media
reports (FT) the Cypriot leaders were felt to be left with little choice. We
discuss this below but why should Germany, other core countries and even the
ECB threaten to take down the Cyprus’ largest banks or threaten full bail-in of
depositors? The answer is that resources are limited. Core EMU is not large
enough to bailout the periphery risk and so default has to be part of the
solution.












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