By The Economist
EVEN by the
standards of European policymaking, the past week has been a disaster. In the
early hours of March 16th, nine months after Cyprus first requested a bail-out,
euro-zone finance ministers, led by the Germans, offered a €10 billion ($13
billion) deal, well short of the €17 billion needed. Who ordered whom to do
precisely what is not clear, but the Cypriots then said they would raise a
further €5.8 billion by imposing a levy on depositors—of 9.9% on savings above
the €100,000 insurance-guarantee limit, and 6.75% for deposits below it. Chaos
ensued, not least among the many Russians (reputable or not) who have parked
their money in the lightly regulated island. On March 19th, with crowds in the
streets and all the banks firmly shut, the Cypriot parliament rejected the
bail-out package (see article). As The Economist went to press, the scene had shifted
to Moscow, where the Cypriots were trying to persuade Vladimir Putin and his
cronies to contribute some money in exchange, perhaps, for future gas revenues.
Cyprus is a
Mediterranean midget, with a GDP of only $23 billion. But this crisis could
have poisonous long-term consequences. Eight months after the European Central
Bank appeared to have restored stability by promising to do whatever it took to
save the currency, the risk of a euro member being thrown out has returned. It
has increased the chances of deposit runs (if Cyprus can grab your money, why
not Italy or Spain?). And it has revealed the lack of progress towards a
durable solution to the euro’s troubles. Ideally, all this will prompt the
Europeans to push ahead with reforms, but with a German election in the autumn
that seems unlikely.
Cyprus is broke.
Its debt, if it took on its banks’ liabilities, would hit 145% of GDP. This
newspaper suggested recapitalising Cypriot banks, on a case-by-case basis,
directly through the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), thus breaking the
vicious circle where weak sovereigns bail out weak banks. We also argued for
depositors and senior bondholders to be spared—not out of any particular love
for rich Russians, but because of the fear of bank runs in larger weak euro
economies. The Europeans instead decided to lend the money directly to the
Cypriot government; and the Cypriots, perhaps bullied by some creditors, then
decided to clobber all the banks’ depositors, even the insured ones.