Monday, December 26, 2011

Big Cities as gateways of prosperity


Why Big Cities Matter More than Ever
   
By Mario Polese
The information revolution, we used to hear, would break the shackles of geography and make cities irrelevant. Thanks to e-mail, the Internet, and an ever-widening array of technological devices, you would be able to work just as effectively in South Podunk as in the Big Apple. A new, post-metropolitan era would open in which creative and flexible firms could locate their operations anywhere. The age of the big city would come to an end.
But that hasn’t happened. Big cities have continued to grow. In rich nations today, urbanization levels are on the order of 80 percent or higher. China and India are urbanizing at breakneck speed, with Shanghai and Bombay racing each other to become the world’s largest metropolitan area and eclipse Tokyo (currently 33 million strong). Why is it that cities have lost none of their powers of attraction, despite the new freedom that information technology brings individuals and firms? The economic advantages of cities—of urban “agglomeration,” in the language of the people who study these things—are difficult to measure precisely and not the same for all firms. But they are quite real, and we can capture them in what I call the Seven Pillars of Agglomeration.
Let’s start with the most basic pillar, one that has historically supported the great manufacturing economies of big cities: economies of scale in production. That is, as the scale of production increases, unit costs fall. That basic rule of economics makes it profitable for firms to manufacture goods in just a few large factories, rather than in many smaller ones. And if you’re going to have just one or two big plants, it makes sense to locate them where you can find a lot of workers: densely packed urban areas. This logic explains the growth of large manufacturing cities like Detroit in the earlier part of the twentieth century. Nowadays, though, it applies most readily to midsize cities, because real estate in larger cities often costs too much to build big factories (see the sidebar below).
Smaller Cities Matter, Too
Consider a remarkable fact: over the long run, the growth rates of American cities in various size groups tend to be about the same. That is, over the last century, the country’s distribution of small, midsize, and big cities has remained stable. This stability intrigues economic geographers. Why aren’t all cities converging toward one ideal size—whether large or small?
Part of the answer is that the attributes that make big cities attractive to some industries make them less attractive to others—and every industry gravitates to locations where its comparative costs are lowest. For example, providing environments for rapid, diverse, face-to-face contacts is a comparative advantage of big cities, while physical space is more readily available in smaller ones. If the demand for face-to-face contacts increases, real-estate and wage costs will rise in the largest cities, crowding out industries for which those costs carry—comparatively—less weight. We understand intuitively that Manhattan isn’t a good location for manufacturing airplanes or laptops. But it’s excellent for management consulting and producing operas. So urban systems have a self-regulating nature: certain industries emerge (or centralize) in the largest cities; others move to smaller ones.
So small cities, no less than large ones, fill an essential economic need. The more attractive big cities become for some industries, the more alluring small cities will be to others.
The second pillar, however, tends to push firms back to larger cities: economies of scale in trade and transportation. Just as larger factories lead to lower unit costs by making manufacturing more efficient, fully loading a truck, an airplane, or a cargo ship leads to lower unit costs by making delivery more efficient. And filling up those trucks, planes, and ships—both coming and going—is generally easier if they’re delivering to the largest ports, airports, and other distribution centers. That means the bigger urban areas.
Reinforcing this tendency is the third pillar of agglomeration: falling transportation and communications costs. Throughout history, transportation costs—not only monetary outlays but also lost time and the frustration that can come with trading with distant partners—have been a barrier to market expansion. It follows that a fall in transportation costs will stimulate trade, enabling the lowest-cost producers to improve market share. And the steeper the drop in transportation costs and the greater the weight of scale economies in production, the greater the potential for centralizing production in one or two places. Henry Ford could locate automobile production in Detroit because paved roads and railways allowed him to reach the entire American market.
Indeed, if scale economies are infinite and transportation costs are close to zero, all production will be centralized in one place, with the first (lucky) producer to have arrived on the scene. Such an extreme case probably doesn’t exist in the real world, but the film industry comes close. Scale in the industry is vitally important, with its enormous sound studios and vast budgets. It costs little to ship a film—and even less if done electronically. The centralization of the film industry in Southern California is the result. With transportation costs removed as an economic factor, competitors had no way to match the scale economy that Hollywood had established early in the twentieth century.
What about the argument that falling communications costs actually undermine urban concentration? For example, didn’t the existence of e-mail encourage Silicon Valley companies to outsource computer programming to Bangalore, India? The truth is that this shift did foster urban concentration—in Bangalore. Think of communications costs as tariffs: competition intensifies when they fall. If one city is already more efficient at producing a particular good and then the barriers are removed, that city’s market share will expand accordingly.
The centralizing influence of technology is consistent with history. The advent of the telegraph—as revolutionary in its time as the Internet is today—not only failed to slow the growth of London and New York; it enabled financial firms and corporate offices in those cities to extend their reach. The arrival of radio and television in the twentieth century replaced a lot of locally produced entertainment with programs produced in New York or Los Angeles.
Scale economies are only part of the urban-expansion story. Most city dwellers work not in massive plants but in small and midsize firms in a wide array of industries: legal services, shirt-making, financial counseling, and on and on. Why should these companies set up shop in cities? Pillar four—the need for proximity with other firms in the same industry—provides part of the answer.
Proximity brings numerous advantages. To name just one: face-to-face contacts remain essential for the most valuable and sensitive information. Finance, among the most spatially concentrated of industries, is an obvious example. Trust must be constantly renewed; millions of dollars will be committed based on a brief encounter. The greater the risks and sums involved, the greater the need for relationships built on something more than e-mail exchanges. Body language, facial expressions, and eye contact are among the signals that financial workers use to judge others.
Personal contact is also crucial in industries where creativity, inspiration, and imagination are vital inputs. For firms working in these rapidly evolving industries—high fashion, say, or computer graphics—the surest way to stay on top of the latest news is to locate near similar firms. The more that information can be transmitted electronically, it seems, the more valuable becomes information that cannot be so transmitted. Electronic and face-to-face communications tend to be complements; business travel, for example, has accelerated since the advent of the Internet. The more people communicate, the more they want to meet in the flesh.
Lower recruitment and training costs are additional advantages of proximity, particularly in highly specialized fields. A firm clearly benefits if it can hire from a pool of available workers with relevant training acquired at previous employers. The chances of finding a first-rate, experienced screenwriter will be a lot better in Los Angeles than in Baton Rouge.
Companies that require a wide array of talents, across a broad range of industries, will be drawn to big cities as well. Thus pillar five: the advantages of diversity. Consider advertising, a field whose products are constantly changing and come with no blueprint. Successful ad firms must rapidly assemble dizzying combinations of expertise and talent according to various clients’ needs. Each ad campaign, after all, is unique: one may call for animation, another for symphonic music, a third for trained chimpanzees. Where better to find the necessary components than in big cities, with their myriad industry clusters? Of the world’s top ten advertising agencies, it is no surprise that three are in New York, three in Tokyo, and two each in London and Paris. The entertainment industry, publishing, and many other fields feel the same pull.
Firms—above all, general-service businesses, for which customer access is important—naturally want to locate in the geographic center of their markets, which brings us to pillar six: the quest for the center. What economic geographers call “centrality” varies by industry, however. For companies with low-scale economies—a gas station, for instance—a central location can simply be a busy street, where the potential number of customers driving by is sufficient to ensure profitability.
But the centrality principle also holds at the national and international levels, and it makes large urban agglomerations particularly appealing. The performing arts are a good example. Broadway, the largest cluster of theaters in America, is in New York City not only because of the sizable local population but also because of all the potential theatergoers within a manageable distance of the city. Greater Philadelphia, with more than 5 million residents, is a mere 90-minute drive away; and don’t forget Gotham’s many rail, air, and bus links to other cities (including distant ones), which bring in countless more potential theatergoers. Centrality is often a legacy of history. Paris, shaped by many centuries of investment in roads, rail, and other transportation modes converging on the capital, remains the undisputed center of the French market.
Finally, there’s pillar seven: buzz and bright lights. Talented and ambitious people benefit from being in a big city, just as firms do—in part because the companies can hire talented and ambitious workers. Some people move to cities not just because they need to make a living (though being in a metropolis does offer all the advantages of a diverse labor market) but also because they want to be where the action is. Ambition, dreams, the need for recognition—all are powerful forces in human behavior. Many a young man or woman will ask: Where are my chances best of meeting the right people and doing exciting things? The answer, for good reason, will often be the big city. Why, indeed, are some people willing to spend small fortunes for apartments on Fifth Avenue or homes in Beverly Hills if not to feel that they are truly at thecenter?
Cities face many challenges in the coming years: municipal debt, onerous taxes, the cost of living, and crumbling infrastructure, among others. But whatever the genuine threats to urban prosperity, human contact is more important than ever in the age of information technology, and people will continue to seek places where they can share ideas, make transactions, and pursue their dreams. There’s nowhere better to do these things than big cities.

The End of Faith


As China's economy continues to trend downward, Beijing's elites are sparking a new, palpable frustration in the general population.
BY CHRISTINA LARSON 
BEIJING – In June, a Chinese friend of mine who grew up in the northern industrial city of Shenyang and recently graduated from university moved to Beijing to follow his dream -- working for a media company. He has a full-time job, but the entry-level pay isn't great and it's tough to make ends meet. When we had lunch recently, he brought up his housing situation, which he described as "not ideal." He was living in a three-bedroom apartment split by seven people, near the Fourth Ring Road -- the outer orbit of the city. Five of his roommates were young women who went to work each night at 11 p.m. and returned around 4 a.m. "They say they are working the overnight shift at Tesco," the British retailer, but he was dubious. One night he saw them entering a KTV Club wearing lots of makeup and "skirts much shorter than my boxers" and, tellingly, proceeding through the employee entrance. "So they are prostitutes," he concluded. "I feel a little uncomfortable."
But when he tallied his monthly expenses and considered his lack of special connections, or guanxi, in the city, either to help boost his paycheck or to find more comfortable but not more expensive housing, he figured he'd stick out the grim living situation. "I have come here to be a journalist -- it is my goal, and I do not want to go back now. But it seems like it's harder than it used to be."
When I asked how his colleagues and former classmates were getting along, he thought about it for a moment and then replied that some were basically in the same lot as him, "but many of my friends have parents in Beijing, and they can save money to live with them. If your family is already established here, it helps a lot." After a moment, he added: "And some of them have rich parents who have already bought them their own apartments -- and cars."
Despite China's astonishing economic growth, it has gotten harder for people like my friend to get by in the big city. His is not a particularly lucrative profession. Like many in Beijing, he cannot count on his annual pay to keep pace with China's official rates of inflation -- which many economists suspect are lowballed anyway. (The consumer-price-index inflation rate is considered so sensitive that the State Council approves it before it is released publicly.) Even so, every month this year consumer-price-index inflation has exceeded the official average monthly target of 4 percent. Last month state media hailed it as good news that it was, officially, just 4.2 percent.
Anyone in Beijing can point to examples of friends who see rents hiked 10 percent or more in one year. The prices at restaurants keep going up, even as portions are getting noticeably smaller. Throw in the loss of intangibles that money can't buy -- like air quality and food safety -- and you begin to understand the grumbling among some of Beijing's non-wealthy folks that their standard of living seems to be diminishing, even as the national GDP surges ahead at a heady 9 percent.
Could it possibly be true that a swath of people in China's big cities is downwardly mobile, if one compared wages with living expenses? I asked Patrick Chovanec, an associate professor at Tsinghua University's School of Economics and Management in Beijing. Alas, he told me, it's difficult to find much clarification in China's famously fudgeable official statistics. (For instance, the official unemployment rate only includes individuals with urban hukous, or permanent residency permits -- which excludes the most economically vulnerable.) Still, he noted: "If you perceive that you're losing buying power -- or have rising but unmet expectations -- that's when people get upset.… And this country, for a country growing at over 9 percent, is in a foul mood."
Indeed, there is a palpable sense of frustration in Beijing, especially compared with the last time I lived here in 2008. You can see it on the dour faces on the metro, hear it in raspy voices at dinner conversations, and especially sense it in the new gruffness of taxi drivers, who no longer think ferrying people around town for 10 yuan, about $1.60, is such a good deal for them (their base fare hasn't been raised). Still, it's hard to rage against abstractions. It's a lot easier to fume at obnoxious people.
No wonder, then, that in 2011 the Chinese media and Sina Weibo (China's version of Twitter) buzzed nearly every month with salacious reports of China's Paris Hilton-types -- the sons and daughters of the wealthy and political elite, dangling opulent accessories and impoverished judgment -- behaving badly in BMWs and Audis and typically expecting to get away with it, to boot.
The year began with the trial of Li Qiming, a university student in Hebei province who in October 2010 was drunk-driving and slammed into two other college students out skating, killing one of them. When he saw what had happened, he tried to speed away, but the campus guard stopped his vehicle. When questioned, the first thing he is widely reported to have blurted out was, "My father is Li Gang." Li Gang is the district's deputy police chief.
Then there was 15-year-old Li Tianyi, the son of a high-ranking army official, who had no license when he got behind the wheel of a BMW in September. While carousing the streets of Beijing, he grew frustrated when another car was blocking his path. He reportedly got out of the car and assaulted the other driver while either he or a friend shouted, "Who will dare call the police?" Behind his car's windshield was a temporary driving pass for the Great Hall of the People, China's parliament building.
And earlier this month, a student at Beijing Film Academy got into a fight over where he could park his Audi, the telltale car of choice of Chinese officials. After a brawl in the parking lot, a cleaner, a 43-year-old migrant worker from nearby Hebei province, was taken to a hospital, where he died.
Perhaps the closest female equivalent was the lightning-rod saga of Guo "Meimei," a petite 20-year-old with a heart-shaped face and big brown eyes who took to posting photos of herself driving her "little horse" (a white Maserati) and her "little bull" (an orange Lamborghini) on her Weibo microblog. On her account, she claimed to be a general manager at the Red Cross of China, one of the country's largest and most politically connected charities. Her luxury goods, not to mention horrible judgment, were widely taken by readers as signs of corruption at the charity. (In the months following the scandal, which reached its zenith in June, donations to the charity dropped offprecipitously). Later, it came out that she held no such position and was rumored instead to be either a mistress or relative of someone at the Red Cross.
The anger in China at such dilettantes misbehaving runs deeper than, say, America's love-hate relationship with Lindsay Lohan. As Michael Anti, a popular Chinese blogger and political commentator, told me, "The rich are becoming a dynasty." Now people in China recognize that "you get your position not by degree or hard work, but by your daddy." Anti added that though corruption and guanxi are hardly new concepts in China, there was previously a greater belief in social mobility through merit. "Before, university was a channel to help you to ruling class. Now the ruling class just promote themselves."
There is a dark sense that something has changed. "It's not simply income equality that bothers people -- that's a misconception," Chovanec told me. "When Jack Ma makes a billion dollars for starting a successful company, that's OK.… It's inequality of privilege. It's how people make their money. There's now a whole class of people getting wealthy because of who they are, not what they do -- and they follow a different set of rules."
In today's China, the abilities to buy and sell real estate and to win government contracts are among the greatest drivers of wealth, and it's those who are already wealthy and well-connected who have access to these opportunities. If their children are lazy or dull, they can use their stature to create opportunities and positions for them, cutting short the trajectories of more able aspirants. Social status is becoming further entrenched because, as Chovanec notes, "Government is so pervasive in China's economy.… Government has great power in determining winners and losers, so who you are and who you know does more than anything else to determine success." And those at the top increasingly act above the law. "Privilege begets money, and money begets privilege."
This, of course, runs counter to the optimistic, popular fairy tale of China over the past 30 years, duly promoted by the ruling Communist Party, that a rising tide and roaring economy inevitably lifts all boats; that the future will be better, materially, than the past; that hard work will get you ahead; and that education is the great leveler. Call it the Chinese dream.
"Well, that used to be true, pretty much -- but not now," reflects Qiao Mu, a professor at Beijing Foreign Studies University. "Take myself. I was born in 1970 into a poor family in west China. There wasn't yet a large class of rich people in China, so the opportunities were more open. At that time, I could depend on my hard work and study to advance. I could change my position in society." But today, he says, sighing deeply, "It's much more difficult for these young guys, my students. You have to rely on your background, and those who already have connections and wealth help themselves and their children.… The condition is getting worse, not better."
Or, as my friend, the struggling reporter, put it: "People no longer believe you can win by working hard and honestly in China."

Disconnecting from science, research and modernity


Welcome to Cairostan
Continued Protests in Cairo
Egypt’s radicals eliminating country’s connection to West, but does anyone care?
By Guy Bechor
It was barely mentioned in the Israeli and global media, but the following event pertains to the whole of Western civilization: Last Saturday, violent groups of Islamic-Salafi radicals burned the famous scientific institute established by Napoleon in Egypt after its first encounter with the West. Some historians consider it the start of modern times in the Middle East.
The site, L’Institut d’Egypte, held some 200,000 original and rare books, exhibits, maps, archeological findings and studies from Egypt and the entire Middle East, based on the work of generations of western researchers. Most of the artifacts were lost forever, burned or looted.
It’s difficult to understand the modern Middle East without these studies, which were overcome by an immense fire. The large building was situated in the center of Cairo and torching it was a symbolic, intentional act. Those who burned the building and its artifacts meant to burn the era of logic, enlightenment, research and individualism.
This was a grave provocation against the whole of Western civilization, a desire to disconnect from science, research and modernity, while cynically using a Western means – that is, democracy – in order to take power.
One need not go all the way to blowing up the pyramids, as some of Egypt’s Salafis wish to do after they seized some 35% of the new parliament seats (alongside 40% of the Islamic brotherhood,) and there is no reason to go as far as Afghanistan, where the Taliban blew up the huge Buddha statues. The elimination of Egypt’s non-Muslim past is already here.
Anything that dates back to the Pharaohs, that is ancient, or that is Western is destined to be destroyed, and the mission has already been launched in the most symbolic manner: The outset of Egypt’s modern era, which the Salafis seek to erase, and in fact rewrite. This is a battle for writing the history of Egypt and of the Arab and Muslim world.
UNESCO’s silence
This isn’t a new phenomenon, and in Jerusalem as well we see elements associated with political Islam trying to erase any presence of the 3,000-year Jewish existence there, on Temple Mount for example – existence that pre-dated Islam.
In 1258, the Mongols burned the immense library in Baghdad known as the “House of Wisdom.” It held rare writings that have disappeared forever, Plato, Aristotle, Pythagoras, and the other cornerstones of Western civilization. All we know today is that these books existed, yet following the terrible fire in Baghdad they were burned forever. The Mongols sought to secure the same objective as Egypt’s Salafis: Erasing the past and keeping only their present.
All of this is happening while the confused West is lauding the new democracy established in Egypt, without understanding that this democracy is erasing the historic Egypt that was intimately connected to the West and its culture; a new Egypt shall rise on the ruins of the great fire. What we are seeing here is not a battle for power, but rather, a battle for perception, memory, heritage and historiography; that is, the writing of history.
Oddly, this is happening in Egypt of all places, a state that always demanded the return of the archeological findings taken from it as part of its national ethos. Artifacts of the era of the Pharaohs are still held in London and in Paris, yet Israel already returned all the archeological findings it discovered in the Sinai. Now, it is doubtful whether Egypt would be able to safeguard its own museums, which are also facing the threat of fire and looting.

A wondrous gift to mankind


Godless societies are unfit for survival
‘My own wish,” said Christopher Hitchens, the God Is Not Great author who died last week, is “to write an anti-Christmas column that becomes fiercer every year.”
Hitchens didn’t live long enough to write a fiercer anti-Christmas column this year: The world has lost its most fashionable atheist. It has also lost a man of irony who inveighed against vulgarity while being vulgar, against propaganda while being a propagandist, and against illogic while being illogical. “What can be asserted without proof can be dismissed without proof,” Hitchens famously wrote, seemingly oblivious that he was himself asserting without proof. Worse, he asserted in ignorance, having made false assumptions.
Hitchens believed that the Judeo-Christian religion cannot be credited with imbuing in people desirable values, asserting: “If all the official stories of monotheism, from Moses to Mormonism, were to be utterly and finally discredited, we would be exactly where we are now.” In dismissing “Thou Shalt Not Steal,” one of the Ten Commandments from God that Moses is said to have brought down from Mount Sinai, Hitchens asserted: “We don’t know of any society that has a commandment saying it’s OK to steal or a social custom that allows it.”
In fact, stealing is and has been lawful in many, perhaps most societies throughout time. The Spartans of ancient Greece encouraged their youth to steal, to teach them how to be surreptitious,resourceful, and agile. The crime — and Spartans punished it harshly — came in stealing badly, and being caught. In other societies, stealing from your own kind is considered immoral; stealing from others a matter of choice. According to Gypsy Law: Romani Legal Traditions and Culture, published by University of California Press, gypsies have no moral objections to stealing “so long as one does not victimize another Gypsy, causes no physical harm, and takes no more than is necessary to survive.”
Even the commandment “Thou Shalt Not Kill” is and was at odds with the values of numerous societies. The Druids killed innocents in ritual slaughters, the Romans for entertainment. In many tribal or clan-based societies, honour killings for sexual transgressions remain obligatory. In most societies, the rules for killing distinguished between killing your own people and killing those of other societies, to whom you owed no obligation.
Moral values are not universal. Those peculiar to modern Western society, as summarized by the Ten Commandments, stem from the notion that there is but one God, and that all humans are created in His image. This entirely novel idea led to the widely accepted Western view that all human life is sacred. The notion of God as the ultimate lawmaker also promoted democracy — God’s Ten Commandments trumped those of any king or despot in Christendom, curbing their power to rule by whim.
Hitchens’ main point, of course, is the stupidity of religious belief, and the superiority of atheism. Where’s the proof? As a believer in evolution and survival of the fittest, he should have found the evidence to the opposite overwhelming. History has shown godless societies to be unfit for survival. Time and again, they have been outcompeted by both gods-fearing and God-fearing societies.
The term “atheist” comes from the ancient Greek, meaning “godless” or “to deny the gods.” It described the various writers and philosophers who doubted the existence of gods, or who doubted that the gods in any way cared about or influenced humans. Godless societies are believed to have existed throughout history although we know little about most of them, presumably because they died out. We do know a little about some, like the Lokayatikas of ancient India who advocated a “faithless” system, and who dwindled out over centuries. Some Pygmy tribes that not only lacked gods but superstitious rites did survive to modern times. But they haven’t thrived.
France’s brief experiment during the French Revolution with state atheism — known as the Cult of Reason — ended badly, in the desecration of churches and synagogues, persecution and a bloodbath at the guillotine. In the last century, godless societies made their comeback in the USSR, Red China, Cambodia and other communist countries. While many then saw these forms of social organization as the way of the future, most communist societies are dying or have died out, North Korea being the last great exemplar of a godless country.
When God’s law is not observed, the law can become whatever the ruler wants it to be: Ultimately there are no human rights, let alone property rights, as totalitarianism reigns. When religion becomes ascendant, so too does the rule of law. Here lies one of the most hopeful trends in the world today — the rapid rise of religion in a land that until recently was almost as soulless as North Korea: China. This still officially atheistic country now has an estimated 300 million worshippers of all faiths, with Christianity the fastest rising among them. Red Chinese Communism’s replacement — today’s lawless cronyism — leaves the Chinese wanting for more. Through growing religiosity, China has its best chance of reforming to a democratic society that respects human dignity and the rule of law.
“God didn’t invent man; man invented God,” Hitchens said. Perhaps that is true — we have no way of knowing. We do know, however, that if man did invent God, it was a useful invention, and a wondrous gift to mankind.
God is great. Have yourself a Merry Christmas!