Benefits - Costs and everything in between
While the stance of monetary policy around the world has, on any
conceivable measure, been extreme, by which I mean unprecedentedly
accommodative, the question of whether such a policy is indeed sensible and
rationale has not been asked much of late. By rational I simply mean the
following: Is this policy likely to deliver what it is supposed to deliver? And
if it does fall short of its official aim, then can we at least state with some
certainty that whatever it delivers in benefits is not outweighed by its costs?
I think that these are straightforward questions and that any policy that is
advertised as being in ‘the interest of the general public’ should pass this
test. As I will argue in the following, the present stance of monetary policy
only has a negligible chance, at best, of ever fulfilling its stated aim.
Furthermore, its benefits are almost certainly outweighed by its costs if we
list all negative effects of this policy and do not confine ourselves, as the
present mainstream does, to just one obvious cost: official consumer price
inflation, which thus far remains contained. Thus, in my view, there is no
escaping the fact that this policy is not rational. It should be abandoned as
soon as possible.
The policy and its aims
The key planks of this policy are super
low interest rates and targeted purchases (or collateralized funding) of
financial assets by central banks. While various regional differences exist in
respect of the extent of these programs and the assets chosen, all major
central banks – the US Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of
England and the Bank of Japan – have been engaged and continue to be committed
to versions of this policy. Its purpose is to facilitate exceptionally cheap
funding for banks and to affect the pricing of a wide range of financial
assets, in particular and most directly government bonds but also mortgage
bonds in the US and real-estate investment trusts and corporate securities in
Japan. There is an ongoing debate in the UK and in the Euro Zone, too, about
directly boosting prices of other, ‘private’ securities, that is, to have their
prices manipulated upwards by direct purchases from the central banks.