By Andrew Roberts
Nothing is inevitable. It was the first truth I was taught as a Cambridge
undergraduate in the 1980s, and it has been italicised and underlined for me by
everything I have learnt since. (I even use spellcheck to excise the word
“inevitable” from my books, lest it’s crept in at a lazy moment.) The whole of
human history is testament to the fact that vast sections of mankind can seem
to be progressing towards what looks like an established goal, only to get
sidetracked into cul-de-sacs, sometimes for decades, occasionally for
centuries. So why do we still assume that an eventual return to any significant
economic growth in the European Union is inevitable?
The news that Greece’s economy shrank by 7 per cent
last quarter, and that for all his valiant efforts even George Osborne, the UK chancellor
has been slapped with a downgrading threat by Moody’s, ought to focus
us upon the thoughts of Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx and Antonio
Gramsci. For it was the leading thinkers of the Whig and Marxist historical
determinist school who infected mankind with the concept that we were
“progressing” somewhere, moving towards a fixed, positive future point. In
economics, that idea is encapsulated in the assumption of economic growth as a
kind of manifest destiny, almost the birthright of the species. All too often
we see growth as something to be taken for granted as a natural part of the
human condition; the rule rather than the exception. If Thomas Macaulay,
Friedrich Engels and the other historical determinists had been right, and
mankind was on a train track towards either the inevitability of universal
liberty or a workers’ paradise, would we have wound up with a 20th century as
scourged as it was?
The past two-thirds of a century have been atypical
for the globe, and peculiarly conducive for growth. Never before had there been
so prolonged a period when no two great powers went to war, if one counts Korea
as a UN operation and discounts the Indochinese border incidents of the 1960s
and 1970s. America was a powerhouse of innovation and leadership, in
competition with a resurgent, confident Japan. Exchange rates went largely
unmassaged. China was quiescent and unable to price European economies out of
raw materials. Food and energy were cheap by historical standards. Trade and
markets were generally freer (in the west) than ever before. Populations were
rising, but controllably so. Interest rates encouraged lending, and competition
between and within European countries was producing what Adam Smith had
promised it would.