About a month ago,
in the third-quarter report of a Canadian global macro fund, its strategist
made the interesting observation that “…Four ideas in particular have
caught the fancy of economic policy makers and have been successfully sold to
the public…” One of these ideas “…that has taken root, at least
among the political and intellectual classes, is that one need not fear fiscal
deficits and debt provided one has monetary sovereignty…”. This idea
is currently growing, particularly after Obama’s re-election. But it was only
after writing our last letter, on the revival
of the Chicago Plan (as proposed in an IMF’ working paper), that we realized
that the idea is morphing into another one among Keynesians: That because there cannot be a gold-to-US dollar arbitrage like in
1933, governments do indeed have the monetary sovereignty.
Is this true?
I will try to show why it is not, and in the process, it will
also describe the endgame for the current crisis. Without further ado…
After the fall of
the KreditAnstalt in 1931, with the world living under the gold-exchange
standard, depositors first in central Europe, and later in France and England,
began to withdraw their deposits and buy gold, challenging the reserves of
their respective central banks. The leverage that linked the balance sheet of
each central bank had been provided by currency swaps, a novelty at the time,
which had openly been denounced by Jacques Rueff. One by one,
central banks were forced to leave the gold standard (i.e. devalue) until in
1933, it was the Fed’s turn. The story is well known and the reason this
process was called an “arbitrage” is simply that there can never be one asset
with two prices. In this case, gold had an “official”, government guaranteed
price and a market price, in terms of fiat money (i.e. schillings, pounds,
francs, US dollars). The consolidated balance sheets of the central bank,
financial institutions and non-financial sector looked like this before the
run:

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