Calling things by their proper names
By Caroline Glick
Next month, America's long campaign in Iraq will come
to an end with the departure of the last US forces from the country.
Amazingly, the approaching withdrawal date has
fomented little discussion in the US. Few have weighed in on the likely
consequences of President Barack Obama's decision to withdraw on the US's hard
won gains in that country.
After some six thousand Americans gave their lives in
the struggle for Iraq and hundreds of billions of dollars were spent on the
war, it is quite amazing that its conclusion is being met with disinterested
yawns.
The general stupor was broken last week with The
Weekly Standard's publication of an article titled, "Defeat in Iraq:
President Obama's decision to withdraw US troops is the mother of all
disasters."
The article was written by Frederick and Kimberly
Kagan and Marisa Cochrane Sullivan. The Kagans contributed to conceptualizing
the US's successful counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq, popularly known as
"the surge," that president George W. Bush implemented in 2007.
In their article, the Kagans and Sullivan explain the
strategic implications of next month's withdrawal. First they note that with
the US withdrawal, the sectarian violence that the surge effectively ended will
in all likelihood return in force.
Iranian-allied Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is
purging the Iraqi military and security services and the Iraqi civil service of
pro-Western, anti- Iranian commanders and senior officials. With American
acquiescence, Maliki and his Shi'ite allies already managed to effectively
overturn the March 2010 election results. Those elections gave the
Sunni-dominated Iraqiya party led by former prime minister Ayad Allawi the
right to form the next government.
Due to Maliki's actions, Iraq's Sunnis are becoming convinced
they have little to gain from peacefully accepting the government.
The strategic implications of Maliki's purges are
clear. As the US departs the country next month it will be handing its hard-won
victory in Iraq to its greatest regional foe - Iran.
Repeating their behavior in the aftermath of Israel's
precipitous withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000, the Iranians and
their Hezbollah proxies are presenting the US withdrawal from Iraq as a massive
strategic victory.
They are also inventing the rationale for continued
war against the retreating Americans. Iran's Hezbollah-trained proxy, Muqtada
al-Sadr, has declared that US Embassy personnel are an "occupation
force" that the Iraqis should rightly attack with the aim of defeating.
The US public's ignorance of the implications of a
post-withdrawal, Iranian-dominated Iraq is not surprising. The Obama
administration has ignored them and the media have largely followed the
administration's lead in underplaying them.
For its part, the Bush administration spent little
time explaining to the US public who the forces fighting in Iraq were and why
the US was fighting them.
US military officials frequently admitted that the
insurgents were trained, armed and funded by Iran and Syria. But policy-makers
never took any action against either country for waging war against the US.
Above the tactical level, the US was unwilling to take any effective action to
diminish either regime's support for the insurgency or to make them pay a
diplomatic or military price for their actions.
As for Obama, as the Kagans and Sullivan show, the
administration abjectly refused to intervene when Maliki stole the elections or
to defend US allies in the Iraqi military from Maliki's pro-Iranian purge of
the general officer corps. And by refusing to side with US allies, the Obama
administration has effectively sided with America's foes, enabling
Iranian-allied forces to take over the US-built, trained and armed security
apparatuses in Iraq.
ALL OF these actions are in line with the US's current
policy towards Egypt. There, without considering the consequences of its
actions, in January and February the Obama administration played a key role in
ousting the US's most dependable ally in the Arab world, president Hosni
Mubarak.
Since Mubarak was thrown from office, Egypt has been
ruled by a military junta dubbed the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.
Because SCAF is comprised of the men who served as Mubarak's underlings
throughout his 30-year rule, it shares many of the institutional interests that
guided Mubarak and rendered him a dependable US ally. Specifically, SCAF is
ill-disposed toward chaos and Islamic radicalism.