Imperial by Design
IN THE first years after the
Cold War ended, many Americans had a profound sense of optimism about the
future of international politics. President Bill Clinton captured that mood
when he told the UN General Assembly in September 1993:
It is clear that we live at a turning point in human history. Immense and promising changes seem to wash over us every day. The Cold War is over. The world is no longer divided into two armed and angry camps. Dozens of new democracies have been born. It is a moment of miracles.
One year later, Charles
Krauthammer emphasized in “The Unipolar Moment” that the United States had
emerged from the Cold War as by far the most powerful country on the planet.2 He
urged American leaders not to be reticent about using that power “to lead a
unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being
prepared to enforce them.” Krauthammer’s advice fit neatly with Fukuyama’s
vision of the future: the United States should take the lead in bringing
democracy to less developed countries the world over. After all, that shouldn’t
be an especially difficult task given that America had awesome power and the
cunning of history on its side.
U.S. grand strategy has
followed this basic prescription for the past twenty years, mainly because most
policy makers inside the Beltway have agreed with the thrust of Fukuyama’s and
Krauthammer’s early analyses.
The results, however, have
been disastrous. The United States has been at war for a startling two out of
every three years since 1989, and there is no end in sight. As anyone with a
rudimentary knowledge of world events knows, countries that continuously fight
wars invariably build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine
civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their
behavior; and they invariably end up adopting ruthless policies normally
associated with brutal dictators. The Founding Fathers understood this problem,
as is clear from James Madison’s observation that “no nation can preserve its
freedom in the midst of continual warfare.” Washington’s pursuit of policies
like assassination, rendition and torture over the past decade, not to mention
the weakening of the rule of law at home, shows that their fears were justified.
To make matters worse, the
United States is now engaged in protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that
have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in around
forty-seven thousand American casualties. The pain and suffering inflicted on
Iraq has been enormous. Since the war began in March 2003, more than one
hundred thousand Iraqi civilians have been killed, roughly 2 million Iraqis
have left the country and 1.7 million more have been internally displaced.
Moreover, the American military is not going to win either one of these
conflicts, despite all the phony talk about how the “surge” has worked in Iraq
and how a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. We may
well be stuck in both quagmires for years to come, in fruitless pursuit of
victory.
The United States has also
been unable to solve three other major foreign-policy problems. Washington has
worked overtime—with no success—to shut down Iran’s uranium-enrichment
capability for fear that it might lead to Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. And
the United States, unable to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons
in the first place, now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them
up. Finally, every post–Cold War administration has tried and failed to settle
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; all indicators are that this problem will
deteriorate further as the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater
Israel.
The unpleasant truth is that
the United States is in a world of trouble today on the foreign-policy front,
and this state of affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years, as
Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the blame game escalates to poisonous levels.
Thus, it is hardly surprising that a recent Chicago Council on Global Affairs
survey found that “looking forward 50 years, only 33 percent of Americans think
the United States will continue to be the world’s leading power.” Clearly, the
heady days of the early 1990s have given way to a pronounced pessimism.
This regrettable situation
raises the obvious questions of what went wrong? And can America right its
course?