You hear a pretty
consistent story about Europe's economic troubles from people in the German
capital. Aspects of this story are fair—the cloistered but earnest perspective
of a country removed from the worst of the crisis. The rest is self-pleasing
bunk.
You hear, for
instance, that the crisis originated in Southern countries and is therefore
those countries' to solve. The sense of the crisis as somebody else's problem
has been palpable in German policy makers' utterances since 2010, but it's
worrisome that it persists even in this election year. European governments
that haven't been voted away by the economic awfulness have at least had to
address it to get re-elected.
Ahead of
September's German vote, by contrast, it's hard to find many politicians talking
publicly about the euro zone at all. "Germany is on a different planet in
this debate," Klaus Deutsch, the head of Deutsche Bank research in
Berlin, told me recently.
You also hear in
Germany that Berlin can't lead Europe, putting aside the fact that it already
does. You hear—or I do at least, in Germany more often than anywhere else in
Europe—that the Continent imported its financial woes from the U.S., that
America's housing bust is truly and deeply to blame.
You hear that
Germany has benefited from the euro, without the slightest acknowledgment that
this might be obvious—an export-dependent nation will always benefit from an
undervalued currency—and hence a smug thing to say. You hear that Germany has
prospered because it sells more than it buys, and because it earns more than it
spends.
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