An American economist looks at Europe
By Pedro Schwart
Economists,
especially in Europe, seem to be divided into two irreconcilable camps over the
question of 'growth versus austerity'. From 2008 to 2012, the
talk was all of consolidating public budgets, increasing taxes, closing down or
merging unsafe banks, selling their assets at fire-sale prices, cutting down on
pension and health entitlements, firing public employees, reducing trade union
privileges and opening labor markets to competition—the classic panoply of
measures the IMF used to demand of Third World countries when it moved in to
rescue them. This time and for the Eurozone, the IMF was content to play second
fiddle: the rescuers were Germany and other northern and central European
countries; the peccant countries they had to rescue were those on the outer
fringes of the Eurozone. The expectation was that this hard medicine would bear
fruit at the latest in 2013 and bring renewed growth and employment after four
years of contraction. Unexpectedly, and for reasons we hope to discover
someday, there was a second dip in the recession. Public opinion, especially in
countries suffering from high unemployment, became restless. In despair many
Europeans leaders turned their eyes towards the United States, hoping to learn
the lessons of its money-printing Federal Reserve and bond-issuing Treasury.
The European Central Bank chief Signor Draghi promised to do "whatever it
takes" to save the euro; Signor Monti was dealt a sharp lesson by Italian
voters; the French President and the Spanish Prime Minister demanded
growth-fostering measures to ease public deficit reduction; the European Council
set in progress a program to help employ young people; and the European
Community as a whole launched a plan to better rail and road transport on the
Continent. Frau Merkel was cast into the role of a Dickensian Gradgrind who
wanted everybody to stick to "Facts! Facts! Facts!" The policy
climate had changed.
These moves were
dictated by political convenience, but the change in policy direction was
reinforced by the effect of a scientific dispute that reverberated beyond the
confines of Academia; an econometric mistake committed by Harvard economists
Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff seemed to put the austerity camp in disarray. At
least this is how Paul Krugman, in line with many others, presented his case
for a deficit financed stimulus.
The
Reinhart-Rogoff slip-up
The controversy
went like this. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) had come to the not-so-surprising
conclusion that an excessive accumulation of public debt tended to reduce the
rate of growth of a country. They went further. They thought they could see a
threshold in the historical series of their sample of countries, whereby a debt
equivalent to more than 60% of GDP in developing economies and of 90% for
advanced economies was accompanied by a non-linear reduction in growth. Though
Reinhart and Rogoff in their paper (2010) allowed for the possibility that the
causation could go from low growth to high debt due to falls in tax revenues,
the implication was that it was debt that led to lower growth when it went over
the threshold of 60% and 90%. This is how, in discussions about austerity versus stimulus,
I myself, along with many others, understood the results.






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