Continued insistence on the universal competence of science will serve only to undermine the credibility of science as a whole
By Austin L. Hughes
By Austin L. Hughes
When I decided on a
scientific career, one of the things that appealed to me about science was the
modesty of its practitioners. The typical scientist seemed to be a person who
knew one small corner of the natural world and knew it very well, better than most
other human beings living and better even than most who had ever lived. But
outside of their circumscribed areas of expertise, scientists would hesitate to
express an authoritative opinion. This attitude was attractive precisely
because it stood in sharp contrast to the arrogance of the philosophers of the
positivist tradition, who claimed for science and its practitioners a broad
authority with which many practicing scientists themselves were uncomfortable.
The temptation to overreach, however, seems increasingly indulged today in
discussions about science. Both in the work of professional philosophers and in
popular writings by natural scientists, it is frequently claimed that natural
science does or soon will constitute the entire domain of truth. And this
attitude is becoming more widespread among scientists themselves. All too many
of my contemporaries in science have accepted without question the hype that
suggests that an advanced degree in some area of natural science confers the
ability to pontificate wisely on any and all subjects.
Of course, from the very beginning of the modern scientific enterprise,
there have been scientists and philosophers who have been so impressed with the
ability of the natural sciences to advance knowledge that they have asserted
that these sciences are the only valid way of seeking knowledge in any field. A
forthright expression of this viewpoint has been made by the chemist Peter
Atkins, who in his 1995 essay “Science as Truth” asserts the “universal competence” of science. This
position has been called scientism — a term that was
originally intended to be pejorative but has been claimed as a badge of honor
by some of its most vocal proponents. In their 2007 book Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, for example,
philosophers James Ladyman, Don Ross, and David Spurrett go so far as to
entitle a chapter “In Defense of Scientism.”
Modern science is often described as having emerged from philosophy; many
of the early modern scientists were engaged in what they called “natural
philosophy.” Later, philosophy came to be seen as an activity distinct from but
integral to natural science, with each addressing separate but complementary
questions — supporting, correcting, and supplying knowledge to one another. But
the status of philosophy has fallen quite a bit in recent times. Central to
scientism is the grabbing of nearly the entire territory of what were once
considered questions that properly belong to philosophy. Scientism takes
science to be not only better than philosophy at answering such questions, but
the only means of answering them. For most of those who dabble
in scientism, this shift is unacknowledged, and may not even be recognized. But
for others, it is explicit. Atkins, for example, is scathing in his dismissal
of the entire field: “I consider it to be a defensible proposition that no
philosopher has helped to elucidate nature; philosophy is but the refinement of
hindrance.”