by Stanley Weiss
When Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan met in July with Russian strongman Vladimir Putin
about the civil war in Syria, political biographers had a right to be confused.
After all, one is
the leader of a government that has imprisoned more journalists than China and Iran
combined; empowered special courts to arrest citizens on suspicion of terrorism without evidence or the right to a hearing; sentenced two students to
eight years in prison for holding a sign at a rally demanding “free education”; and has seen more than 20,000 complaints filed against it in the
European Court of Human Rights since 2008.
The other is
president of Russia.
That the leader of
secular, democratic Turkey—a longtime US ally and member of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization—has managed to out-Putin Putin when it comes to
steamrolling civil liberties the past ten years is just the beginning of the
way politics is changing on the Black Sea. Even while Putin receives a fresh
round of global scorn for the two-year prison sentence meted out to three young
women of the “Pussy Riot” punk band, Erdogan has
successfully executed every trick in the Putin playbook except one. But it is
that one failure that may have the most dramatic effect on Turkey’s future and
the direction of US foreign policy.
For two neighbors
that fought eight wars between them from the eighteenth through the early
twentieth century, Russia and Turkey have a lot in common. Both bridge Asia and
Europe. Both enjoyed historic runs as world powers. Both have declared their
intention to join Europe. And under Putin and Erdogan, both have taken historic
steps away from democracy in an attempt to recapture past glory. Call it the
four steps toward autocracy in a global age.











.jpg)





.jpg)

