The Egyptian republic's economic course has been
problematic, to say the least. Gamal Abdul Nasser's experiment with nationalization, central planning and
Soviet-assisted industrialization left the economy hobbled by regulation and
inefficiency. Anwar Sadat's successor regime relaxed the government's grip, but accumulated a
mountain of foreign debt that caused stagnation through much of the 1980s.
But fortune favored the economy thereafter. Much of
Egypt's external debt was forgiven or restructured in the wake of the Gulf War.
And in the decade that followed, per capita GDP calculated in terms of
purchasing power rose by one-third simply on the strength of containing both
inflation and budget deficits.
Mubarak subsequently introduced major market-based
reforms -- steps toward privatization and deregulation -- that permitted growth
to accelerate to the 7 percent range. His technocrats also negotiated the
global recession without a tumble, responding with a domestic stimulus (mostly
infrastructure investment) that largely offset declines in private investment
and exports. In the two years prior to the Arab Spring, the economy seemed to
be back on the rapid development track.
However, in the years of high growth, though
unemployment in the formal market rarely fell below 9
percent, youth
unemployment hovered around
25 percent, and increasing
numbers of college graduates never managed to get a first job. Moreover, the
stimulus barely touched smaller enterprises, reinforcing the popular impression
that the game was rigged in favor of insiders.
The revolution and lingering uncertainty during the
transition exacted a huge toll on economic performance. The economy has since
been creeping back, but at a pace hopelessly short of the 7 percent pace needed
to absorb new entrants to the labor force. And the prospects for acceleration are
mixed.







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