What are
the alternatives?
The Cypriot
banking system is insolvent; it needs a large capital injection. As in several
other peripheral states of the Eurozone, Cyprus cannot resolve the crisis
alone. Given an already high debt-to-GDP ratio and an oversized banking system,
recapitalising the banks via sovereign debt would produce unsustainable
sovereign-debt levels and, ultimately, sovereign default. In short, Cyprus’s
banks are too big to fail, and too big to save.
This is why
Cyprus negotiated a rescue package with the Troika – ECB, European Commission
and IMF. The ‘bailout’ agreement (in quotation marks, as it is not quite sure
who is supposed to be bailed out here, certainly not Cypriot taxpayers and
their children, to be burdened with debt for a long time) is still in the
making and might even fall through. The damage, however, has already been
done. There has been a complete loss of confidence, not only in the Cypriot
banking system but also in the crisis-management capacity of the Eurozone.
The Saturday morning hangover
The decision
taken in the early hours of last Saturday caused indignation and rejection
across Europe, and rightly so. While imposing market discipline is a useful
aim, and long overdue after four years of bailouts at the expense of taxpayers
and future generations, the way it was originally to be imposed in the case of
Cyprus has been more than counter-productive.
Economists and
practitioners alike point to a couple of common principles in bank resolution. One is respect for creditor ranking:
·
Equity holders take a hit before junior debt holders;
·
Junior debt holders take a hit before senior creditors and uninsured
depositors.
·
Insured depositors should take a hit last.
Such a creditor
ranking is based not only on legal rules, but also on the idea that claims
should be priced according to their risk and expected repayment in case of
failure.
The ‘bailout’
deal with Cyprus foresees, however, a tax on deposits, originally imposed on
all deposits even those covered by the EU-wide deposit insurance. Put
differently, insured depositors suffer a haircut, while uninsured depositors
still maintain a large share of their claims. This seems a violation of the
creditor ranking, in spirit if not in the letter of the law.
In order to not
violate the promise of deposit insurance of up to 100,000 euros, what the
agreement calls a tax is effectively an insurance co-payment. There is nothing
to be said against co-insurance, which can improve market discipline, but
introducing it ex-post constitutes a clear violation of trust. And if it walks
like a duck and it quacks like a duck, let’s call it a duck! This is not a tax,
but an ex-post insurance co-payment and loss-sharing arrangement.
But there is
more. Imposing losses on depositors is to be done in order to reduce the risk
of sovereign over-indebtedness and thus guarantee repayment of current
sovereign-bond holders. Imposing losses on insured bank depositors to thus
guarantee repayments to sovereign-bond holders violates another political
priority of putting (certainly more sophisticated) bond holders above (mostly
less sophisticated) holders of small deposits.
Finally,
imposing a tax on depositors of all banks, independent of the financial
situation of each bank, further undermines market discipline. Yes, it seems an
easier option, requiring less administrative effort, but it sends the message
that investors do not have to price investments properly as the haircut is the
same across banks. And it increases herding trends towards aggressive
risk-taking.
Addressing the problem at its core
The Cypriot
economy is in crisis, for many reasons. But the insolvency of the banking
system is at the core of the current crisis, and should therefore be the focus
of the resolution. The literature on resolving bank crises has pointed to
several important lessons. On is that losses should be recognised early on,
allocated and then managed. While the flow solution, i.e. re-establishing
solvency of the banking system through retained earnings or future government
earnings, seems attractive as it avoids immediate pain, it comes at high risks.