by Llewellyn H. Rockwell Jr.
It didn’t take long for opponents of the
market to pounce after the events of 2008. The crash was said to prove how
destructive "unregulated capitalism" could be and how dangerous its
supporters were – after all, free-marketeers opposed the bailouts, which had
allegedly saved Americans from another Great Depression.
In The Great Deformation, David Stockman – former US congressman
and budget director under Ronald Reagan – tells the story of the recent crisis,
and takes direct aim at the conventional wisdom that credits government policy
and Ben Bernanke with rescuing Americans from another Great Depression. In this
he has made a seminal contribution. But he does much more than this. He offers
a sweeping, revisionist account of US economic history from the New Deal to the
present. He refutes widely held myths about the Reagan years and the demise of
the Soviet Union. He covers the growth and expansion of the warfare state. He
shows precisely how the Fed enriches the powerful and shelters them from free
markets. He demonstrates the flimsiness of the present so-called recovery.
Above all, he shows that attempts to blame our economic problems on
"capitalism" are preposterous, and reveal a complete lack of
understanding of how the economy has been deformed over the past several
decades.
The Great Deformation takes on the stock arguments in
favor of the bailouts that we heard in 2008 and which constitute the
conventional wisdom even today. A "contagion effect" would spread the
financial crisis throughout the economy, well beyond the confines of a few Wall
Street firms, we were told. Without bailouts, payroll would not be met. ATMs
would go dark. Wise policy decisions by the Treasury and the Fed prevented
these and other nightmare scenarios, and staved off a second Great Depression.
The bailout of AIG, for example, was
carried out against a backdrop of utter hysteria. AIG was bailed out in order
to protect Main Street, the public was told, but virtually none of AIG’s busted
CDS insurance was held by Main Street banks. Even on Wall Street the effects
were confined to about a dozen firms, every one of which had ample cushion for
absorbing the losses. Thanks to the bailout, they did not take one dollar in
such losses. "The bailout," says Stockman, "was all about
protecting short-term earnings and current-year executive and trader bonuses."
Ten years earlier, the Fed had sent a
clear enough signal of its future policy when it arranged for a bailout of a
hedge fund called Long Term Capital Management (LTCM). If this firm
was to be bailed out, Wall Street concluded, then there was no limit to the
madness the Fed would backstop with easy money.
LTCM, says Stockman, was "an
egregious financial train wreck that had amassed leverage ratios of 100 to 1 in
order to fund giant speculative bets in currency, equity, bond, and derivatives
markets around the globe. The sheer recklessness and scale of LTCM’s
speculations had no parallel in American financial history…. LTCM stunk to high
heaven, and had absolutely no claim on public authority, resources, or even
sympathy."