The looming pension meltdown is still within our power to avert
by JOSH BARRO
When Dan Liljenquist began his
first term as a Utah state senator in January 2009, his financial acumen
quickly earned him serious legislative responsibilities. A former management
consultant for Bain & Company, Liljenquist was appointed by the Utah senate
president, Michael Waddoups, to three budget-related committees; he was also
made chairman of the Retirement and Independent Entities Committee. As
Liljenquist remembers it, Waddoups pre-empted any concerns the freshman might
have had about his new responsibilities: "Don't worry," Waddoups
said, "nothing ever happens on the retirement committee."
But then, in the early months of 2009, the stock
market went into free fall. Worried about the effects the market crash would
have on Utah's public-employee pension plan — which, like most states', is
invested heavily in equities — Liljenquist asked the plan's actuaries to
project how much taxpayers would have to pay into the pension fund in order to
compensate for the stock-market losses. The figures that came back were
alarming: Utah was about to drown in red ink. Without reform, the state would
see its contributions to government workers' pensions rise by about $420
million a year — an amount equivalent to roughly 10% of Utah's spending from
its general and education funds. Moreover, those astronomical pension expenses
would continue to grow at 4% a year for the next 25 years, just to pay off the
losses the fund had incurred in the stock market.
This scenario alarmed lawmakers, and for good reason.
It also alarmed public employees, who feared that rising pension costs would
limit the state's ability to pay higher wages. Tapping into these concerns
during the 2010 legislative session, Liljenquist built consensus around a
cost-saving reform plan: Utah will now require all state employees hired after
June 2011 to choose one of two retirement options — either a 401(k)-style
benefit plan, or a sharply modified pension plan with costs to taxpayers capped
in advance. The reform isn't perfect, of course, but it will be significantly
less expensive for Utah's taxpayers, and will leave more room in the state
budget for the real business of government.
Utah, it seems, has thus narrowly escaped catastrophe.
But what about the other 49 states? The pension-cost explosion is hitting
nearly every one of them, too. And unlike Utah's, these states' efforts at
pension reform are not being overseen by management consultants. Rather, in
most places, state legislators are overmatched by savvy public-employees'
unions and by pension-fund managers wedded to the status quo. Their influence
explains why, though 18 states enacted some sort of pension reform in 2010,
very few will offer real, long-term relief to taxpayers.