The Cahuzac affair in France has conveniently emerged just as the search
for possible scapegoats to Europe’s quandary was intensifying. Thanks to the
former French budget minister’s secret Swiss bank account, Europe can now move
from its war against finance (Hollande declaring that finance was his enemy,
the financial transaction tax, capping of bonuses, etc) to an outright
war against tax havens (letting
Cyprus sink, arm-twisting Luxembourg into abandoning its banking-secret policy,
etc).
Leaving
aside the EU’s increasing penchant
for forcing members to adopt policies that blatantly go against national
interests (like the Tobin tax in the UK), yesterday’s
announcement by Luxembourg of an “open-book” policy raises the question of
whether the EU is cutting off its nose to spite its face. If tax havens have existed and thrived
for so long, they must have some sort of economic justification.
Beyond
the debate on the "morality" of hiding one’s wealth, let us simply
focus on the possible consequences of closing down havens. First assume that
there are two kinds of deposits in these jurisdictions: the perfectly legal
kind, and the illegal kind (such as the ones that Jerome Cahuzac had in
Switzerland). For an economist, there is no reason to differentiate between the
two. Combine them and the amounts get large. Large enough to offer both types
of investors economies of scale, a large array of financial services needed,
etc.
Now
the reality for most
tax havens is that their economies are far too small to absorb the excess
savings that pour into their countries. Their banks thus
end up being large buyers of assets outside of the country. All else being
equal, this should be good news for “foreign assets”. If, for example, a
Luxembourg bank decides to buy French or German bonds with the deposits of a
Belgian dentist, then the yields in Germany and France will be lower than they
would have otherwise been. If that account is now closed and moved to Singapore
to buy SGD bonds (probably a smart trade anyway), then interest rates in France
and Germany will move higher, while they fall in Singapore.
Europe’s welfare states are already on the brink...
Or to
put it another way: when it comes to the illegal deposits, the economic net
effect of Mr Cahuzac hiding his money in Switzerland was for this “gentleman”
to have a lower tax rate. If the governments of the world now succeed in
getting these deposits in the open, it will be equivalent to a tax increase, no
more no less. And increasing taxes massively, when tax rates are already
unbelievably high, would be a sure recipe for sending the struggling economies
into a tailspin. Look at it this way: with their domestic economies already circling the drain,
can the French, Italian or Spanish entrepreneurs stomach a tax increase? Once
again, a war on tax havens is (at least for an economist without any moral
compass) nothing but an attempt to increase taxes to prop up bankrupt welfare
states; i.e., yet another attempt to send good money after bad to continue
feeding the leviathan.