It is impossible for the
U.S. to maintain the reserve currency and run trade surpluses
By CHARLES HUGH SMITH
By CHARLES HUGH SMITH
Many well-meaning commentators look back on the era of strong
private-sector unions and robust U.S. trade surpluses with longing. The
Progressive consensus (articulated by Robert Reich, among others) is that
unions gave the working and middle classes bargaining power that has been lost
in the decline of unions.
Other commentators look back with similar nostalgia on the large trade
surpluses (i.e. current account surplus) of the same era--the 1950s and 1960s.
The two trends are connected. Unions had bargaining
power because the corporations on the other side of the table were generally
cartels (autos, steel, etc.) that were largely domestic, meaning that they were
captive to domestic markets and politics.
All these conditions have changed. Present-day
U.S. corporations are global, not domestic; up to 75% of their sales and/or
profits are generated in overseas markets, and a similar percentage of their
workforces are also overseas, not just for cost reasons but to stay close to
the markets generating their profits.
Free-trade agreements restrict attempts to protect domestic markets from
overseas competition, and as a result domestic unions have essentially zero
bargaining power with either nominally American firms or their global
competitors in most markets. The only sectors open to union bargaining power
are domestic monopolies or cartels with no overseas competition, i.e. the
government, which is why the union movement is now dominated by public unions.
The trade surpluses vanished for two reasons: global competition and protection of the dollar as the world's reserve currency. This is a
difficult issue to grasp, so let's do it in parts:
1. When the global exporting nations recovered after World War II, their costs of labor and production were cheaper than American industry, which was hobbled by the strong dollar. For example, $1 bought 250 yen as recently as the early 1970s. Today, it barely buys 100 yen.
2. As a result, cheap imports took market share from domestic producers (believe it or not, BMWs were once relatively cheap), and the U.S. trade balance went negative, i.e. the U.S. ran trade deficits. To settle the deficits, the U.S. had to ship gold to the creditor nations.
3. As the trade deficits expanded, America's gold holdings shrank. The writing was on the wall: continued deficits would eventually shrink the U.S. gold holdings to zero, at which point deficits would be impossible to sustain.
4. As a result, President Nixon closed the gold window and the U.S. dollar floated in a market of supply and demand.
The second half of the story is Triffin's Paradox, an issue I have covered
in depth in:





_0208_-_Pakistani-christians-_in_Lahore_(Punjab).jpg)








