With the Cypriot government
still 'undecided' about what to 'take' and the European leaders very much
'decided' about what to 'give', the fact of the matter is, as JPMorgan explains
in this excellent summary of the state of affairs in Europe, that because ELA
funding facility is limited by the availability of collateral (and the haircuts
applied to those by the central bank), and cutting the Cypriot banking system
completely from ELA access is equivalent to cutting it from the Eurosystem
making an exit from the euro a matter of time. This makes it inevitable
that capital controls and a capital freeze will be imposed, in their view,
but it is not only bank deposits that are at risk. A broader retrenchment in
funding markets is possible given the confusion and inconsistency last
weekend's decision created for investors relative to previous policy decisions.
Add to this the move by Spain, which announced this week a tax or bank levy
(probably 0.2%) to be imposed on bank deposits, without details on which
deposits will be affected or timing, and the chance of sparking much
broader deposit outflows across the union are rising quickly.
By JPMorgan,
Capital Control
Risks
What was widely
viewed as an ill-conceived Cyprus deal last weekend renewed fears of a
re-escalation of the euro debt crisis. The original proposal to hit insured
depositors below €100k caused a bank run and set a new
precedent in the course of the Euro area debt crisis, with potential
negative consequences for bank deposits not only in Cyprus but also in other
peripheral countries. Once again, as it happened with the Greek crisis last
May, the Cyprus crisis exposes the fragmentation of the deposit guarantee
schemes in the Euro area and its inconsistency with a monetary union.
Even if the
original deal is eventually revised and the guarantee for depositors with less
than €100k is respected, the damage from the original proposal will be
difficult to undo, in our view.
Cypriot banks are
relying on ECB’s Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) to avert a collapse once
they open next week. ELA reflects collateralized borrowing from the national
central bank rather than the ECB directly, not only at a more punitive interest
rate relative to refi rate but more importantly with much larger collateral
haircuts. The ECB is still on the hook under ELA because the national central
bank borrows these funds from the ECB, i.e. it generates a liability against
the Eurosystem. The ECB’s provision of liquidity via ELA is admittedly not a
given but it will be provided to Cypriot banks for as long as Cyprus is looking
to finalize its revised bailout plan, the so called Plan B.
Although the ECB
always states that it provides liquidity to only solvent and well-capitalized
institutions, past experience with Irish and Greek banks and even with Cypriot
banks shows that the ECB has tolerated long periods of liquidity provision to
undercapitalized institutions. Greece is the most characteristic case. Greek
banks had access to ELA even when the bank recapitalization was pending between
April and December 2012. And Greek banks had access to ELA in-between the two
Greek elections when it was not even clear whether Greece would stay in the
euro. Cutting the Cypriot banking system completely from ELA access is
equivalent to cutting it from the Eurosystem making an exit from the euro a
matter of time. This is a political decision rather than a decision
that the ECB can take alone. This would effectively cut the Central Bank of
Cyprus off from TARGET2 and force it along with the Cypriot government to
eventually issue its own money.
But even assuming
that a new deal is agreed between Cyprus and the Eurogroup and ELA continues
for the Cypriot banking system after Monday, this does not mean that this ELA
is unlimited. ELA is limited by the availability of collateral and the
haircuts that the central bank applies to this collateral. The Greek case
is the most characteristic example of how punitive haircuts on ELA collateral
can be. As of the end of January Greek banks used €122bn of collateral to
borrow €31bn via ELA, i.e. an implied haircut of 75%. In contrast, they
borrowed €76bn via normal ECB operations posting collateral of €97bn, i.e. the
implied haircut on their normal ECB borrowing was 22%. The higher haircut on
ELA collateral i.e. is mostly the result of the lower quality of this
collateral, typically credit claims, vs. that accepted in normal ECB
operations, typically securities. But it perhaps also reflects the higher
riskiness the ECB sees with its counterparty, i.e. the national central bank
and eventually the sovereign, when a country's banking system has to resort to
ELA.