The ECB is now a lender of last resort not only to the commercial banks in its club but to governments in its area
Almost from the start, the single currency was seen as a necessary
ingredient of a unified Europe. The Treaty of Rome that launched the Common
Market was signed in 1957; the Werner Report outlining the path towards full
economic and monetary union was commissioned in 1969 and made official in 1970.
Despite this relatively early start, the creation of a solid euro is taking
time; from the beginning it was beset with incident. It was not finally
launched until the year 2000. The honeymoon lasted until 2007. Since then,
progress has become less than smooth, to say the least.
The original euro
The intention was to make the euro a special kind of currency, a sort of
European Deutschemark with no need for a government to back it. Monetary
sovereignty would reside in a fully independent European Central Bank. Its
remit according to the Maastricht Treaty (1992) was strictly reduced to issuing
the euro, to managing an area-wide interest rate, and to leading the old
national central banks in the oversight of the Eurozone banks. The ECB was to
be a rule-bound institution. Its only obligation was to maintain the purchasing
power of its currency. Knowing that repeated budget deficits and continuous
accumulation of sovereign debt sooner or later lead the issuer of the currency
to print excessive amounts of money, a parallel document, the Stability and
Growth Pact (1998) put a limit to member states' deficits and debt. This
transfer of monetary sovereignty to the ECB and the limiting rules accompanying
it meant that neither member states nor the European Union could use the euro
as an instrument of discretionary economic management. In practice, no
devaluation and no inflation imposed a harsh discipline on the Ministers of
Finance of the Euro area—a welcome brake on democratic profligacy.
This well-meaning project had its failings, as experience has shown. Some
small instrumental changes, especially regarding the over-lenient interest rate
policy, would have given the new currency greater stability. But nobody made
clear from the start its possible costs in terms of budgetary discipline,
structural reform and reduction of entitlements. A pampered electorate should
have been told the price to be paid for the great advantage of a stable
currency. In sum, the euro could have been a sort of pale replica of the gold
standard, aspiring to the solidity of gold but free of gold's automatic
rigidity. Better that than nothing.
An 'American' euro
The current crisis has led the European authorities and the Bank to throw
away the monetary ideal of rule-bound action, independence from politics and
attention to the long run. The ECB is now a lender of last resort not only to
the commercial banks in its club but to governments in its area. Far from being
independent of politics, it is in continuous consultation and collaboration
with European and national authorities. The current president of the ECB has
gone so far as to says that the Bank will "do whatever it takes" to
save the euro, which markets have understood as creating all the liquidity necessary
to stop speculators. Thus, the ECB is now turning itself into a traditional
government banker, ready to aid and abet in counter-cyclical monetary
management, protectionist exchange rate policy, and 'controlled' inflationism.